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LAWYER COMMUNICATIONS ON TIE INTERNET:
BEGINNING THE MILLENNIUM WITH DISPARATE
STANDARDS
Louise L. Hill*
Abstract: Lawyer communications on the Internet constituting commercial speech are
subject to state ethics rules governing lawyer advertising and communication. Because each
state operates as a separate entity with its own rules that govern the lawyers of its jurisdiction,
the profession is faced with disparate standards on a jurisdictional basis. Of the forty-three
states that have adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, four-fifths have standards
on lawyer communications that vary from those in the Model Rules. Not only is there
variation in the rules themselves, but differences exist in the specific applicability and
interpretation of these rules to components of electronic communications. As technology
evolves, new features continue to surface that present the profession with questions relating to
the propriety of their use. When a lawyer communicates on the Internet, it is unclear which
jurisdiction's rules are applicable and to what standard the conduct of lawyers will be held.
Technological changes have helped to render state-by-state regulation of lawyer
communications both ineffective and obsolete. To enable lawyers to properly conduct
themselves in the practice of law and most effectively represent clients, lawyer
communications should be regulated by national standards rather than by individual state
rules.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers regularly communicate on the Internet, a global medium of
communications that links people and entities via computer.' Lawyers
1. See Internet, 12 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 169, at 81:553 (Sept. 18,
1996). Designed as part of a government project to formulate a defense system immune from attack,
Vol. 75:785, 2000
Lawyer Communications on the Internet
use the Internet to display and retrieve information on the World Wide
Web,2 where visitors use browsers to access information from around the
world.3 Information is sent and received through listservs,4 where
lawyers may post material for view in network newsgroups,5 use e-mail
for exchanging information with designated entities,6 or engage in
conference areas and chat groups where participants express themselves
simultaneously through their keyboards.' Although the Internet has been
in existence since the early 1960s,8 the advent of widespread Internet use
by lawyers is relatively new.9 As recently as November, 1994, only five
the Internet was created in a "piecemeal fashion, and with the intent of using many pathways to
transfer information." Lucy Schlauch Leonard, The High-Tech Legal Practice: Attorney-Client
Communications and the Internet, 69 U. Colo. L. Rev. 851, 854-55 (1998).
2. The World Wide Web links information on Interet-linked computers "by setting common
information storage formats (HTML) and a common language for the exchange of Web documents
(HTrTP)." ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 837 (E.D. Pa. 1996). "[Ihe Web can display HTML
documents containing text, images, sound, animation and moving video ... [which] can include
links to other types of information or resources." Id. at 836. The U.S. Supreme Court stated the
following about the World Wide Web:
The best known category of communication over the Internet is the World Wide Web, which
allows users to search for and retrieve information stored in remote computers, as well as, in
some cases, to communicate back to designated sites. In concrete terms, the Web consists of a
vast number of documents stored in different computers all over the world. Some of these
documents are simply files containing information. However, more elaborate documents,
commonly known as Web "pages," are also prevalent. Each has its own address--"rather like a
telephone number." Web pages frequently contain information and sometimes allow the viewer
to communicate with the page's (or "site's") author. They generally also contain "links" to other
documents created by that site's author or to other (generally) related sites.
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 852 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
3. See Internet, supra note 1, at 81:553.
4. A "listserv" is an "on-line discussion group that has a server through which messages can be
posted by members of that particular listserv. Messages can be sent privately by e-mail or posted to
the entire group. A discussion topic or 'thread' develops and members of the group can reply to each
other's posts." James M. McCauley, Cyberlawyers: Impact of the Internet on Law Practice and
Legal Ethics (on file with author). Listservs exist for essentially every legal area. See id.
5. A "newsgroup" is a type of bulletin board service in which users can exchange information.
See Internet, supra note 1, at 81:553. A "bulletin board service" is a network where electronic
messages may be posted, browsed, or delivered to e-mail boxes. See id There are more than 10,000
newsgroups on the Interet. See McCauley, supra note 4.
6. "E-mail," or electronic mail, is an electronic message sent between computers through a private
or local-area network, "not routed though a central control point," that "can take many and varying
paths to the recipients." See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 834.
7. See id.
8. See infra notes 242-49.
9. See William E. Hornsby, Jr., The Ethical Boundaries of Selling Legal Services in Cyberspace,
(visited Jan. 15, 1998) <http://www.eomputerbar.org/netethic/abawill.htm>.
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law firms had home pages' ° on the World Wide Web." Within seven
months time, this number increased to five hundred.' 2 Surveys of large
and small law firms by the American Bar Association (ABA) in 1997
indicated that, of the firms responding, home pages were on-line for over
half of the large firms and almost two-thirds of the small firms. 3
Indications are that this number is more than eighty percent and rising."
As law firms increase their presence on the Internet, some lawyers
have begun to advertise there for the first time.15 This shift is partially
because "[t]he World Wide Web dramatically alters the economics of
attorney advertising while expanding its reach."' 6  All lawyers
communicating on the Internet face questions relating to permissible
practices and the applicability of legal ethics rules. While the rules on
lawyer communications apply to all exchanges by lawyers, the rules
governing advertising and solicitation apply only to commercial
speech. 7 The a-jurisdictional uniqueness of the Internet calls into
question whether traditional legal ethics rules should apply to the
Internet. Assuming such rules are applicable, disparate standards
implemented by the states make it difficult, if not impossible, for lawyers
to comply with the rules of multiple jurisdictions.
10. A "Web page" is a computer file in the HTML format with text and graphics that can be
obtained over the Internet. A "Web site" is a set of computer files in the same format, organized
around a central "home page." See supra note 2.
11. See Elizabeth Wasserman, Lawyers File Few Objections to Advertising on the Net, San Jose
Mercury News, July 17, 1995, at IA.
12. See id. at I0A.
13. A 1997 ABA survey of large law firms indicated that 51% of responding firms had home
pages and 60% of those without home pages had plans to develop them. See Melinda M. Hansen,
Lawyers, Firms Vie for Visibility by Creative Use of Home Pages on Web, 14 Laws. Man. on Prof.
Conduct (ABA/BNA) Current Reports, at 237 (May 27, 1998). An ABA companion study of small
firms indicated that 64% of those responding used the Internet, up from 38% the previous year. See
id. A 1997 National Law Journal survey of large firms reported 64% of those responding had sites
on the Internet. See id. A survey titled "Internet Lawyer-Microsoft Corporation of Internet and
Online User Trends in the Legal Profession," released in January, 1997, found that 600,000 lawyers
use of the Internet. See id.
14. See Adam Katz-Stone, Law Firms Wade Further into Advertising Waters, Washington Bus. J.,
Apr. 20, 1998, at 35.
15. See Janet Stidman Eveleth, Advertising on the Internet, Md. B.J., May/June 1998, at 18, 20. It
has been suggested that "most state lawyers are violating the rules with their online listings." Steven
France, The Long Arm ofLegal Ethics, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1999, at 19.
16. Mark Hankins, Ambulance Chasers on the Internet: Regulation of Attorney Web Pages, (on
file with author).
17. See infra note 46.
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Part II of this Article begins by covering the development of rules
relating to lawyer advertising and solicitation from an historical context.
Part III then focuses on individual state rules addressing lawyer
communications and how various jurisdictions are interpreting their rules
within the context of the Internet. Part IV addresses specific components
of the Internet being utilized by lawyers, the efficacy of their use, as well
as the issue of choice of laws and rule applicability. This Article
concludes that a national standard on lawyer communication is necessary
to provide direction for lawyers and information for the public that can
be clearly evaluated and understood.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF RULES RELATING TO ADVERTISING
AND SOLICITATION
Principles of etiquette and good taste, along with the existence of
readily available business, tempered solicitation by lawyers during the
profession's formative period.'8 In the English Inns of Court 9 and
colonial America,2" lawyers were few in number and formed a closely
knit group.2 Many lawyers regarded the profession 2 as a public
18. See Louise L. Hill, Solicitation by Lawyers, Piercing the First Amendment Veil, 42 Me. L.
Rev. 369, 378 (1990); John H. Wilbur, Advertising, Solicitation and Legal Ethics, 7 Vand. L. Rev.
677, 678 (1954).
19. The Inns of Court had powers of education, discipline, and government within the legal
profession in England. See Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times 88-89
(1953). The Benchers and Readers, who lectured at the Inns, were the most prestigious of the
members. See id. at 89. The next grade of membership was the Barristers, who could plead and argue
cases, followed by Inner Barristers, who were younger members not yet authorized to represent
clients in the courts. See id By the twentieth century, the Inns of Court had ceased to be great
educational or disciplinary bodies; their primary function became the examination of students for
admission before the courts as Barristers. See Edward S. Roscoe, The Growth of English Law 219-
20 (1911).
20. It was customary for some young men desiring to be members of the legal profession to study
law in England at the Inns of Court. See Francis R. Aumann, The Changing American Legal System:
Some Selected Phases 32 (1969). Of the four great Inns of Court-Gray's Inn, Lincoln's Inn, Inner
Temple, and Middle Temple-the members of the Middle Temple are said to have taken a leading
part in the birth of the American nation. See Cornelius Comegys, A Summer Sojourn Among the Inns
of Court 98, 125 (Dennise 1969) (1922).
21. See Hill, supra note 18, at 377; Paul H. Francis & Jennifer J. Johnson, The Emperor's Old
Clothes: Piercing the Bar's Ethical Veil, 13 Willamette L.L 221,223-24 (1977).
22. As the legal profession in England evolved during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the
law came to be regarded as a learned profession, along with medicine and theology. See Hill, supra
note 18, at 376; Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 6, 7
(1976).
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service, 3 refusing to compete for clients because doing so would destroy
their intimacy and reduce them to the status of tradesmen. 4
However, hostility developed toward the professions during the
nineteenth century in America, 5 with particular animosity directed
toward those who practiced law.26 In response to popular sentiment that
special privileges were accorded members of the legal profession,27 many
states enacted legislation that reduced or eliminated previously
established qualifications for the practice of law.28 Following the Civil
War, the bar in the United States was essentially open and large groups
of lawyers competed for business insufficient to accommodate their
numbers.29 To stop the rampant commercialism of the as-yet unregulated
bar, leaders among lawyers began to re-establish standards of character,
education, and training within the profession.3"
23. The pursuit of a public service is considered a general characteristic of the professions. See
Henry Drinker, Legal Ethics 5 (1953); Pound, supra note 19, at 5. Dean Roscoe Pound described a
profession as "a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of a public
service-no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood .... Gaining a
livelihood is incidental, whereas in a business or trade it is the entire purpose." Pound, supra note
19, at 5. It was not characteristic for members of the legal profession to be wholly dependent on their
profession for their livelihood. See Hill, supra note 18, at 376.
24. See Francis & Johnson, supra note 21, at 224. Drinker stated that a primary characteristic that
distinguishes the legal profession from business is a "duty of public service, of which the emolument
is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money."
Drinker, supra note 23, at 5.
25. See Drinker, supra note 23, at 19.
26. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 95 (2d ed. 1985); Don J. Young &
Louise L. Hill, Professionalism: The Necessity for Internal Control, 61 Temp. L. Rev. 205, 207
(1988).
27. See Drinker, supra note 23, at 19; Marshall Beil, Controlling Lawyers by Bar Associations
and Courts, 5 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 301, 303 (1970); Young & Hill, supra note 26, at 207; Philip
J. Wickser, Bar Associations, 15 Cornell L.Q. 390, 393 (1930).
28. See Drinker, supra note 23, at 19; Beil, supra note 27, at 303-04; Friedman, supra note 26, at
318; see also Ind. Const. art. 7, § 21 (1852) (repealed 1932) ("Every person of good moral character,
being a voter, shall be entitled to admission to practice law in all courts ofjustice."); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. ch. 177, § 2 (1842) ("Any citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, on
application to the superior court, shall be admitted to practice as an attorney.").
29. See generally Drinker, supra note 23, at 20; Friedman, supra note 26, at 633-34; John A.
Matzko, "The Best Men of the Bar": The Founding of the American Bar Association, in The New
High Priests: Lawyers in Post-Civil WarAmerica 75, 77-78 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984).
30. See Drinker, supra note 23, at 20. As a means to re-establish standards for the profession,
lawyers sought the reorganization of bar associations throughout the country. See id. The Alabama
State Bar Association formulated and adopted the first formal Code of Ethics for the American legal
profession in 1887. See id. at 23. This Code condemned solicitation, but not advertising. As a
general rule of guidance to the Alabama Bar, the Code of Ethics stated that "[n]ewspaper
advertisements, circulars and business cards, tending professional services to the general public, are
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A. Condemnation ofAdvertising and Solicitation by the Canons of
Professional Ethics and the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility
The American Bar Association (ABA) was organized in 1878"' and
promulgated standards for the legal profession in 1908 with the Canons
of Professional Ethics (Canons).32 The Canons, which were adopted in
whole or in part throughout the United States, condemned lawyer
advertising and solicitation.3 Advertising is generally considered to be a
group communication that informs the public that a lawyer is available to
perform services.34 Solicitation, on the other hand, is generally
considered to be a personal appeal directed toward a prospective client.35
Carving an exception for simple business cards, Canon 27 provided as
follows:
The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards
being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of
convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by
circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications, or
interviews, not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional.36
Over time, the Canons allowed for the publication of information
about law firms in legal directories, as well as dignified "institutional
advertising by state and local bar associations" designed to provide the
public with information about available legal services.37 However,
proper, but special solicitation of particular individuals to become clients ought to be avoided.' 118
Ala. XXIU-XXXIV (Rule 16) (1899).
31. The ABA was organized in August, 1878, at Saratoga, New York, a fashionable and well-
known summer resort. See James W. Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers 287
(1950). The lawyers associated with the ABA who formulated and implemented the Canons were
primarily commercial lawyers who represented large clients, rather than smaller, less dignified
practitioners. See Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice 41-42 (1976); Friedman, supra note 26, at
650-51. Membership in the ABA was selective: by 1900 just 1.3% of the country's lawyers were
members; this grew to only 3% by 1910. See Hurst, supra, at 289.
32. Canons of Professional Ethics (1908); Drinker, supra note 23, at 23.
33. See infra note 36 and accompanying text
34. See Judith Maute, Scrutinizing Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation Rules Under Commercial
Speech and Antitrust Doctrine, 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. 487,495 (1986).
35. See idt
36. Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 27 (1908).
37. See John B. Attanasio, Lawyer Advertising in England and the United States, 32 Am. J.
Comp. L. 493, 503 (1984).
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advertising and the solicitation of clients by lawyers and law firms
remained a prohibited practice. 8
During the 1960s, a consensus developed among the bar that the
Canons were incomplete, unorganized, and failed to "recognize the
distinction between the inspirational and proscriptive."39 As a result, the
ABA replaced the Canons in 1969 with the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (Model Code), to serve "both as an inspirational guide"
and "as a basis for disciplinary action" when lawyers failed to meet
minimum standards."a As had been the case with the Canons, almost all
of the states adopted the Model Code, with minor modifications.4
The general condemnation of advertising and solicitation was carried
over from the Canons to the Model Code.42 The Model Code, as
originally adopted, provided that "lawyer[s] shall not publicize
[themselves]... through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio
or television announcements... or other means of commercial
publicity."'43 Lawyers were also prohibited from recommending their
employment to "non-lawyer[s] who ha[d] not sought [their] advice," or
accepting employment resulting from "unsolicited advice to a [non-
lawyers] that [they] should obtain counsel or take legal action."'4
Because lawyer advertising and solicitation were considered commercial
speech,46 these activities were thought to fall outside the protection given
38. See id.
39. Edward L. Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility: Its History and Objectives, 24
Ark. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1970).
40. Model Code of Professional Responsibility Preliminary Draft, at 1 (1969). The Model Code is
composed of three parts: (1) Canons-concise statements setting forth the basic duties of lawyers,
(2) Ethical Considerations-statements of activity and conduct to which practitioners should aspire,
and (3) Disciplinary Rules-statements setting forth minimum standards of conduct that must be
met. Id.
41. See Louise L. Hill, Lawyer Advertising 45 (1993); see generally Nat'l Rep. Legal Ethics
(Univ. Pub. Am.) (David Luban ed., 1989).
42. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
43. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-101(B) (1969).
44. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-103(A) (1969).
45. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-104(A) (1969).
46. Commercial speech is "speech of any form that advertises a product or service for profit or for
business purpose." John E. Nowak et al., Constitutional Law 923 (2d ed. 1983). But cf Thomas W.
Merrill, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine,
44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 205, 234 (1976) (arguing that commercial speech definition should be narrow to
"assure that the reduction in First Amendment protection afforded commercial advertising does not
endanger important interests"); Karl R. Swartz, Note, 32 Kan. L. Rev. 679, 685 (1984) (noting that
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by the U.S. Constitution 7 The Model Code permitted limited advertising
only after the U.S. Supreme Court's recognition that commercial speech
is entitled to some First Amendment protection.
B. Commercial Speech is Entitled to Partial First Amendment
Protection
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.,48 decided in 1976, was the first U.S. Supreme Court
decision to declare that commercial speech is entitled to partial First
Amendment protection because of its informational value to individual
consumers and the general public.49 Addressing the issues of commercial
speech and the regulation of professionals, the Court invalidated a
Virginia statute that forbade licensed pharmacists from advertising
question of "what is commercial speech?" never definitively answered by U.S. Supreme Court and
is defined differently in different decisions).
47. The idea that commercial speech is not entitled to First Amendment protection arose in the
U.S. Supreme Court decision of Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The Court intimated
that the commercial motivation of the advertiser, rather than the content of the speech, rendered
commercial speech undeserving of protection under the First Amendment. See id. at 54. The Court
acknowledged that states and municipalities "may not unduly burden or proscribe" the freedom of
"communicating information and disseminating opinion," but stated that "the Constitution imposes
no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising." Id. at 54; cf. Clyde D.
Stoltenberg & Douglas Whitman, Direct Mail Advertising by Lawyers, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 381, 385
(1984) (arguing that Chrestensen did not entirely eliminate protection for commercial speech; no
authority exists for legislative curbing of even "purely commercial advertising" in absence of
competing public interest). Despite this exclusion of commercial speech from First Amendment
protection, the Court continued to address cases dealing with potential, limited constitutional
protection of some forms of commercial speech. In these later cases, however, the content of the
speech, rather than the motivation behind the speech, began to assume a greater role in the analysis.
In determining if speech was commercial, the Court distinguished purely commercial advertisements
that merely proposed a business transaction from advertisements that expressed an editorial position
on matters of social or political concern. Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
266 (1964) (holding that advertisement of civil-rights organization that communicated information
vital to public interest worthy of constitutional protection), with Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384-85 (1973) (holding that although "speech is not
rendered commercial by the mere fact that it relates to an advertisement," help-wanted
advertisements divided into sex-designated columns are unprotected commercial speech, even
though under media supervision). The fact that speech appeared as a paid advertisement did not
necessarily render it commercial or constitutionally unprotected. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S.
809, 818 (1975) (invalidating on First Amendment grounds statute making it misdemeanor to
encourage procurement of abortions by advertisement).
48. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
49. See id. at 754-65.
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prescription-drug prices." The Court determined that the consuming
public's First Amendment interest in the free flow of truthful
information about a lawful commercial activity outweighed the state's
asserted interest in maintaining professionalism among licensed
pharmacists.5 The Court held that a state may not ban the "dissemination
of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful
of that information's effect upon its disseminators and its recipients."52
While protected from complete prohibition by the First Amendment, the
Court noted that commercial speech may be subject to certain forms of
regulation.53 Examples given of permissible commercial speech
regulation were: (1) reasonable regulation of time, place, and manner of
speech; (2) prohibition of advertising that is false or mis-leading;
and (3) prohibition of advertisements that propose transactions that are
themselves illegal. 4
One year after granting commercial advertising First Amendment
protection in Virginia Pharmacy, the U.S. Supreme Court extended
similar protection to an attorney advertisement in Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona." In Bates, in contravention of state ethics rules,56 two attorneys
placed an advertisement in a newspaper listing fees for routine legal
50. See id. at 773. The Court had to determine whether the communication "I will sell you the X
prescription drug at the Y price," which lacked any editorial position on a social or political issue,
lay outside the protection of the First Amendment. Id. at 761. With respect to this commercial
information, the Court noted that particular consumers' interests in such commercial information
"may be as keen, if not keener by far, than [their] interest in the day's most urgent political debate."
Id. at 763.
51. See id. at 770. The Court observed that an advertising ban did not ensure professionalism. The
actual effect of the ban was to keep the state's consuming public ignorant of certain costs. See id. at
769.
52. Id. at 773.
53. See id. at 770. The Court noted that the state is "free to require whatever professional
standards it wishes of its pharmacists .... But it may not do so by keeping the public in ignorance of
the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists are offering." Id.
54. See id. at 771-72. These types of regulations are available with noncommercial speech as
well. Time, place, and manner restrictions are permissible if they are not based on the content of the
message, satisfy a significant governmental interest, and permit other alternative forms of speech.
See id.
55. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
56. The lawyers in Bates were sanctioned for violating DR 2-101(B) of the Arizona Code of
Professional Responsibility (codified at Rule of Sup. Ct. of Ariz. 17A). See id. at 355-56. The
applicable rule in Arizona in 1976, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 26 (Supp. 1976), was substantially similar
to the disciplinary rule promulgated in the ABA's Model Code in 1969. See supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
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servicesY As in Virginia Pharmacy, the Bates Court applied a balancing
test to determine the constitutionality of the rule prohibiting lawyer
advertising."8 The Court weighed the public's need for and right to
accurate information concerning the cost and availability of legal
services against the state's arguments for the maintenance of legal
professionalism. 9  Finding "the postulated connection between
advertising and the erosion of true professionalism to be severely
strained,"'  the Court determined that public access to the legal system
outweighed the state's interest, thereby prohibiting a "blanket
suppression" of lawyer advertising.6'
C. Advertising Is Permitted Following Bates But Solicitation
Continues to Be Condemned
After Bates, the "focus of debate over lawyer advertising shifted from
whether advertising should be permitted to how it should be regulated.
62
The ABA drafted and approved two proposed disciplinary rules
57. Bates, 433 U.S. at 354.
58. Id. at 368-79. The speaker's expressional interests are not balanced against the general social
need to regulate speech; rather, what is weighed is "the interest of the public in hearing the speech
against the interest of that very same public in not hearing it." Jonathan Weinberg, Constitutional
Protection of Commercial Speech, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 720,746 (1982).
59. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 3 68-79. In support of the rule prohibiting lawyer advertising, the state
presented a six-point analysis urging the validity of the regulation. The state argued that: (1)
advertising would undermine the attorney's sense of dignity and self-worth, thereby degrading the
legal profession; (2) because attorneys' services are so highly individualized, price advertisement
would inherently mislead the consumer by ignoring the particular attorney's skills and by failing to
tailor the information to a particular client's needs; (3) advertising would stir up litigious tendencies
among the public; (4) high advertising costs would be passed on to consumers through increased
fees and discourage young attorneys from setting up practice; (5) advertising would discourage
quality service because attorneys would likely provide standard services to clients, regardless of
actual need; and (6) a general restriction against advertising lends itself to tighter enforcement than a
less restrictive alternative. See id
60. Id. at 368. In discussing the public's need for information regarding the availability and terms
of legal services, the Court noted the following: (1) the public has a right to make informed,
intelligent choices concerning legal counsel; (2) lack of advertising encourages the public to avoid
the legal profession out of fear of exorbitant fees or an inability to locate a competent attorney; and
(3) advertising may help to reduce prices, making legal services fully available, particularly for "the
not-quite-poor and the unknowledgeable." Id. at 370, 376-77.
61. Id. at 379, 383. The only constitutional issue addressed was whether a state can prevent an
attorney from publishing a "truthful advertisement concerning the availability and terms of routine
legal services." Id. at 384.
62. David W. Parr, Direct-Mail Solicitation by Attorneys: Bates to R1M.J., 33 Syracuse L. Rev.
1041, 1051 (1982).
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governing the regulation of advertising.63 One proposed rule construed
Bates liberally, forbidding only "false, fraudulent, misleading or
deceptive" advertising; in contrast, the second model reflected a narrow
reading of Bates, listing numerous restrictions on the time, place, and
manner of lawyer advertising.' The latter proposed rule, referred to as
the "regulatory" model, was ultimately adopted by the ABA.65 Known as
the "laundry-list" approach, the Model Code was amended to allow
advertising by explicitly designating twenty-five categories of infor-
mation a lawyer could include in a publication regarding the lawyer's
services. 66
63. See ABA, Board of Governors Report 177B (1977).
64. Id. at 5, 11-30.
65. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-101, 2-102 (1980). The ABA House of
Delegates recommended that both of the proposed rules be sent to the individual states for
consideration. See John R. Welch, Bates, Ohralik, Primus-The First Amendment Challenge to State
Regulation of Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation, 30 Baylor L. Rev. 585, 603 (1978). While the
ABA acted expeditiously in revamping its model disciplinary rule on advertising, the individual
jurisdictions' reaction to Bates was hesitant and a number of states were slow to formulate new
advertising standards. See Geoffrey C. Hazard et al., Why Lawyers Should be Allowed to Advertise:
A Market Analysis ofLegal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1084, 1086 (1983).
66. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-101. That section was amended as
follows:
DR 2-101 Publicity
(A) A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner, associate or any other lawyer affiliated
with him or his firm, use or participate in the use of any form of public communication
containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim.
(B) In order to facilitate the process of informed selection of a lawyer by potential consumers of
legal services, a lawyer may publish or broadcast, subject to DR 2-103, the following
information in print media distributed or over television or radio broadcast in the geographic
area or areas in which the lawyer resides or maintains offices or in which a significant part of
the lawyer's clientele resides, provided that the information disclosed by the lawyer in such
publication or broadcast complies with DR 2-101(A), and is presented in a dignified manner:.
(I) Name, including name of law firm and names of professional associates; addresses
and telephone numbers;
(2) One or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm practices, a statement
that practice is limited to one or more fields of law, or a statement that the lawyer
or law firm specializes in a particular field of law practice, to the extent authorized
under DR 2-105;
(3) Date and place of birth;
(4) Date and place of admission to the bar of state and federal courts;
(5) Schools attended, with dates of graduation, degrees and other scholastic
distinctions;
(6) Public or quasi-public offices;
(7) Military service;
(8) Legal authorships;
(9) Legal teaching positions;
(10) Memberships, offices, and committee assignments, in bar associations;
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Although it granted partial First Amendment protection to lawyer
advertising, the Bates Court specifically reserved the question of the
permissible regulatory scope of in-person client solicitation by lawyers.67
However, not long after Bates, the Court addressed the matter of in-
person solicitation of clients by lawyers in the companion cases In re
Primus6 8 and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association.6 9
In Primus, a cooperating lawyer with the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) addressed women who had been sterilized as a condition
of continued receipt of government benefits, advising them of their legal
rights and suggesting that a lawsuit was possible.7" Lawyer Edna Primus
was disciplined for later sending a letter to one of these women, advising
(11) Membership and offices in legal fraternities and legal societies;
(12) Technical and professional licenses;
(13) Membership in scientific, technical and professional associations and societies;
(14) Foreign language ability;
(15) Names and addresses of bank references;
(16) with their written consent, names of clients regularly represented;
(17) Prepaid or group legal services programs in which the lawyer participates;
(18) Whether credit cards or other credit arrangements are accepted;
(19) Office and telephone answering service hours;
(20) Fee for initial consultation;
(21) Availability upon request of a written schedule of fees and/or an estimate of the fee
to be charged for specific services;
(22) Contingent fee rates subject to DR 2-106(C), provided that the statement discloses
whether percentages are computed before or after deduction of costs;
(23) Range of fees for services, provided that the statement discloses that the specific
fee within the range which will be charged will vary depending upon the particular
matter to be handled for each client and the client is entitled without obligation to
an estimate of the fee within the range likely to be charged, in print size equivalent
to the largest print used in setting forth the fee information;
(24) Hourly rate, provided that the statement discloses that the total fee charged will
depend upon the number of hours which must be devoted to the particular matter to
be handled for each client and the client is entitled to without obligation an
estimate of the fee likely to be charged, in print size at least equivalent to the
largest print used in setting forth the fee information;
(25) Fixed fees for specific legal services, the description of which would not be
misunderstood or be deceptive, provided that the statement discloses that the
quoted fee will be available only to clients whose matters fall into the services
described and that the client is entitled without obligation to a specific estimate of
the fee likely to be charged in print size at least equivalent to the largest print used
in setting forth the fee information.
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-101 (1980).
67. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350,366 (1977).
68. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
69. 436 U.S. 447(1978).
70. In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 414-16.
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her that the ACLU would provide free legal representation should she
sue the doctor who performed her sterilization surgery.7' Upon review,
the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the application of designated
disciplinary rules, granting full First Amendment protection to the
lawyer's speech.72 The Court reasoned that Primus's actions constituted
an expression of her political beliefs and the ACLU's legitimate
objectives.73 While recognizing that the state generally had the power to
regulate the legal profession,74 the Court held that the solicitation
deserved the broad protection granted to political expression by the First
Amendment, instead of the more limited protection afforded commercial
speech.75
In contrast with Primus, the lawyer disciplined in Ohralik solicited
two eighteen-year-old automobile-accident victims on a face-to-face
basis, offering his services for a contingency fee.76 Shortly after the
accident, lawyer Albert Ohralik visited one of the victims in the hospital
and the other at her home.77 He defended his actions by saying that in-
71. See id. The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of
South Carolina disciplined attorney Edna Primus for soliciting a client on behalf of the ACLU and
for soliciting a client after having provided unsolicited legal advice in violation of DR 2-
103(D)(5)(a) and (c), and DR 2-104(A)(5) of the disciplinary rules of the Supreme Court of South
Carolina. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 416,418-21.
72. The Court held that the application of the South Carolina disciplinary rules violated the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 439.
73. See id. at 422, 431, 439. Relying primarily on NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the
Court viewed Primus's speech as political rather than commercial. See id. at 431-32. In Button, the
Court characterized activities by NAACP attorneys, in which they arranged community meetings to
discuss school desegregation and offered to represent attendees in legal proceedings to achieve
desegregation, as "modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments." NAACP, 371 U.S. at 420-21, 428. The Court held that solicitation of prospective
desegregation litigants was included within the right to associate for the advancement of political
goals and ideas, and thus could not be prohibited by the state "under its power to regulate the legal
profession." Id. at 428-30.
74. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 432. The state claimed that the disciplinary action against Primus was
"part of a regulatory program aimed at the prevention of undue influence, overreaching,
misrepresentation, invasion of privacy, conflict of interest, lay interference, and other evils.., in
solicitation." Id. While not denying the power of the state to take measures to guard against such
matters, the Court reiterated that 'broad rules framed to protect the public and to preserve respect
for the administration of justice' must not work a significant impairment of 'the value of
associational freedoms."' Id. at 426 (quoting United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois Bar Ass'n,
389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
75. See id. at 431,434, 437-38.
76. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,449-51 (1978).
77. See id. at 450-51. The Court found the facts to be a "striking example of the potential for
overreaching that is inherent in a lawyer's in-person solicitation of professional employment." Id. at
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person solicitation constituted commercial speech and therefore was
protected by the First Amendment.78 In rejecting this argument, the Court
distinguished the advertisement in Bates from in-person solicitation,
noting the latter "may exert pressure [on the accident victim] and often
demands an immediate response," leaving the victim little "opportunity
for comparison or reflection."79 The Court noted that the lawyer's
conduct in Ohralik was primarily to advance his own pecuniary interests,
rather than to vindicate the legal rights of others, or exercise political
expression or associational freedom."0 Given the state's compelling
interest in preventing the potential for overreaching inherent in
solicitation, the rule restricting a lawyer's in-person solicitation of
employment was rationally justified.8' The message to the legal
468. The Court's condemnation of Ohralik's conduct in its synthesis of the case illustrates the
extreme nature of his acts:
He approached two young accident victims at a time when they were especially incapable of
making informed judgments or of assessing and protecting their own interests. He solicited
Carol McClintock in a hospital room where she lay in traction and sought out Wanda Lou
Holbert on the day she came home from the hospital, knowing from his prior inquiries that she
had just been released. Appellant urged his services upon the young women and used the
information he had obtained from the McClintocks, and the facts of his agreement with Carol, to
induce Wanda to say "O.K" in response to his solicitation. He employed a concealed tape
recorder, seemingly to insure that he would have evidence of Wanda's oral assent to the
representation. He emphasized that his fee would come out of the recovery, thereby tempting the
young women with what sounded like a cost-free and therefore irresistible offer. He refused to
withdraw when Mrs. Holbert requested him to do so only a day after the initial meeting between
appellant and Wanda Lou and continued to represent himself to the insurance company as
Wanda Holbert's lawyer.
Id. at 467.
78. See id. at 455. Ohralik argued that such solicitation may provide an individual with
"information about his or her legal rights and remedies," thereby promoting informed decision
making. Id. at 458. The Court rejected this justification, noting that the applicable disciplinary rules
neither prohibit a lawyer from communicating such information to individuals nor from
recommending that they obtain counsel. See id. What is prohibited is "using the information as bait"
to obtain a client for a fee and accepting employment as a result of the unsolicited advice given. Id.
Ohralik was disciplined under DR 2-103(A) and DR 2-104(A) of the Ohio Code of Professional
Responsibility. See id at 453 & n.9. The applicable rules in Ohio were identical to those
promulgated by the ABA in 1969. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
79. Id at 457. The Court explained that unlike solicitation, advertising provides information to the
public and leaves individuals "free to act upon it or not." Id. The Court added that "[t]he aim and
effect of in-person solicitation may be to provide a one-sided presentation and to encourage speedy
and perhaps uninformed decisionmaking [sic]; there is no opportunity for intervention or counter-
education by agencies of the Bar, supervisory authorities, or persons close to the solicited
individual." Id.
80. Seeid at458.
81. See id. at 464-67. Commentators have noted that the Court abandons the analytical
framework developed in commercial-speech cases when it considers non-advertising forms of
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profession was that lawyers are permitted to advertise, but commercial,
non-political solicitation is prohibited. 2
D. Central Hudson Test for Regulation of Commercial Speech
In 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered a decision that helped
clarify the degree of constitutional protection to which commercial
speech is entitled. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
83Service Commission, a case not involving lawyer advertising, the Court
advanced a four-part test to evaluate an order banning promotional
advertising that might stimulate the use of electricity.84 The four-part test
formulated by the Court required that: (1) the speech must not concern an
unlawful activity or be misleading, (2) the restriction on commercial
speech must serve a substantial governmental interest, (3) the regulation
must directly advance the asserted governmental interest, and (4) the
regulation must be "no more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest."85 The Court struck down the order, finding that the Public
Service Commission satisfied the first three prongs of the test,86 but
promotion by professionals. Specifically, it does not discuss benefits and applies a less-rigorous test
to measure the importance of costs. See, e.g., Fred S. McChesney, Commercial Speech in the
Professions: The Supreme Court's Unanswered Questions and Questionable Answers, 134 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 45, 57 (1985).
82. See Hill, supra note 18, at 398.
83. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
84. See id. at 558-60. The New York Public Service Commission originally promulgated the
order during the energy shortage of the early 1970s, concerned it would not have sufficient fuel
reserves to meet consumer demands for the 1973-74 winter. See id. at 559.
85. Id. at 566. The fourth prong of the Central Hudson test came to be known as the "least
restrictive means" analysis, whereby a state had to show a commercial-speech restriction was the
least-restrictive means available to further its interests in order for the restriction to withstand First
Amendment scrutiny. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 644, 651
n.14 (1985) (assuming validity of"least restrictive means" analysis in dicta). In Board ofTrnstees v.
Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989), the Court stated that some standard short of a least restrictive means is
required for a commercial-speech restriction to be valid. Id. at 477; see also infra notes 104-11 and
accompanying text.
86. There was no claim that the utility company's advertisements were misleading, deceptive, or
related to unlawful activity. See Central Hudson, 477 U.S. at 566. The Court found the
Commission's interests in energy conservation, and in fair, efficient utility rates to be substantial.
See id. at 568-69. While the Court determined that the state's argument conceming the effect of
advertising on utility rates was "at most tenuous" and "highly speculative," it did find that the bans
on the advertisements directly advanced energy conservation. Id. at 569.
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failed to satisfy the fourth prong because it did not show that a more
limited speech regulation would not protect the governmental interest.87
In the 1982 case of In re R.MJ.,88 the U.S. Supreme Court
implemented the four-part Central Hudson standard and found that a rule
limiting lawyer advertising to ten delineated categories of information
violated the First Amendment. 9 Applying the Central Hudson standard,
the Court found impermissible a rule prohibiting mailings to persons
outside of specifically delineated classifications of individuals. 90 The
R.MJ. Court was unable to find "that restrictions short of an absolute
prohibition would not have sufficed to cure any possible deception."9'
The Court used the Central Hudson "least restrictive means" standard
to evaluate rules relating to the commercial speech of lawyers twice more
during the 1980s.92 As a result, courts tended to invalidate jurisdictional
rules that prohibited designated categories of speech, but courts tended to
uphold rules that required disclosure of information.93
87. See fid at 571. The rule failed under the least restrictive means test because all advertising was
restricted without any showing that a more limited restriction would not adequately further the
interest in energy conservation. See id at 569-71. For example, the ban might conceivably prevent
the utility from advertising "products and services that use energy efficiently." Id. at 570.
88. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
89. See id at 206-07. The lawyer in question was privately reprimanded for violating Missouri's
version of DR 2-101(B) that allowed lawyers to "'publish... in newspapers, periodicals and the
yellow pages of telephone directories'" the following: "'name; address and telephone number, areas
of practice; date and place of birth; schools attended; foreign language ability; office hours; fee for
an initial consultation; availability of a schedule of fees; credit arrangements; and the fixed fee to be
charged for [ten] specified routine services.'" Id at 194 (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat., Sup. Ct. R. 4, DR
2-101(B) (1978)). An addendum to the rule prescribed how an attorney could list areas of practice in
an advertisement. See id at 194-95 & 195 n.6 (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat., Sup. Ct R. 4, Addendum III
(1977)). The lawyer included information in advertisements other than that explicitly permitted by
rule. See li at 196-97.
90. See id. at 206-07. The lawyer was charged with violating Missouri's version of DR 2-
102(A)(2) which prohibited a lawyer from mailing a "'brief professional announcement card stating
new or changed associates or addresses, change of firm name, or similar matters' to anyone other
than "'lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends, and relatives."' Id. at 196 (quoting Mo. Rev.
Stat, Sup. Ct. R. 4, DR 2-102(A)(2)). The lawyer mailed a letter announcing the opening of his new
office to individuals with whom he had no personal or professional ties. See id.
91. I. at207.
92. See infra notes 104-11.
93. See infra notes 104-11.
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E. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Permit Advertising But
Prohibit Solicitation
In 1983, the ABA replaced the Model Code with the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules).94 The movement that led to the
Model Code's replacement began in the 1970s, when members of the bar
contended that the tripartite structure of the Model Code was confusing.9'
In addition to this, the Model Code was criticized as being irrelevant,
ambiguous, and contradictory. 96
With the promulgation of the Model Rules in 1983, the sphere of
acceptable lawyer advertising was expanded in response to case law,
though solicitation of clients continued to be prohibited. The Model
Rules addressed lawyer communications generally in Rule 7.1, which
provided that "[a] lawyer shall not make a false or misleading
communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services."97 The Model
Rules then specifically addressed advertising in Rule 7.2, which allowed
lawyers to advertise through public media, provided they complied with
designated record-keeping requirements. 8 Maintaining the condemna-
94. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, I The Law ofLawyering: A Handbook on
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct xxvii (Prentice Hall L. & Bus.) (Supp. 1988). The late
Robert J. Kutak, former chair of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, took the
position that the Model Rules define the law of lawyering and seek to guide the conscientious
lawyer to balance competing duties in the professionally responsible representation of clients. See
Robert J. Kutak, The Law of Lawyering, 22 Washburn L.J. 413, 418 (1983).
95. See Hazard & Hodes, supra note 94, at xxxv.
96. See Robert J. Kutak, Model Rules: Law For Lawyers or Ethics For the Profession, 38 Rec.
A.B. City N.Y. 140, 142-43 (1983); Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional
Responsibility, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 702 (1977); see also Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the
Simultaneous Representation of Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and
Controversy, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 211,212 (1982).
97. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.1 (1983). Model Rule 7.1 characterized a
communication as false or misleading if it:
(a) contains a material representation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the
statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;
(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or states or
implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the rules of professional
conduct or other law; or
(c) compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services, unless the comparison can be
factually substantiated.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.1.
98. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.2 (1983). Model Rule 7.2 provided:
Rule 7.2 Advertising
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tion of solicitation, Model Rule 7.3 echoed language from Ohralik, and
used the substantial motive of a "lawyer's pecuniary gain" to delineate
impermissible conduct.99 The 1983 version of Model Rule 7.3 permitted
general mailings but not targeted mailings, the latter being considered
nearer to solicitation than advertising."0
F. Compelled Disclosure and Direct-Mail Solicitation Permitted
In 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Zauderer v. Office of Discipli-
nary Counsel,' again found two prohibitions on lawyers' speech
impermissible: (1) prohibitions on the solicitation of legal business
through advertisements containing advice and information regarding
specific legal problems, and (2) prohibitions against the use of
illustrations in advertising. °2 The Zauderer Court determined that the
(a) Subject to the requirements of Rule 7.1, a lawyer may advertise services through public
media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical, outdoor
[advertising], radio or television, or through written communication not involving solicitation as
defined in Rule 7.3.
(b) A copy or recording of an advertisement or written communication shall be kept for two
years after its last dissemination along with a record of when and where it was used.
(c) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer's
services, except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable cost of advertising or written
communication permitted by this rule and may pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer
referral service or other legal service organization.
(d) Any communication made pursuant to this rule shall include the name of at least one lawyer
responsible for its content.
Id.
99. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. Model Rule 7.3 provided as follows:
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client with whom the
lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by mail, in-person or otherwise, when a
significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain. The term "solicit"
includes contact in person, by telephone or telegraph, by letter or other writing, or by other
communication directed to a specific recipient, but does not include letters addressed or
advertising circulars distributed generally to persons not known to need legal services of the
kind provided by the lawyer in a particular matter, but who are so situated that they might in
general find such services useful.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.3 (1983).
100. Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 7.3 (1983); see also Hill, supra note 41, at 52.
101. 471 U.S. 626(1985).
102. 111 at 632-33, 655-56. A lawyer ran two newspaper advertisements. One informed readers
that he would represent individuals charged with drunk-driving and would refund his legal fee if the
client was convicted on a drunk driving charge. See id. at 629-30. The second ad displayed a
drawing of an intrauterine device, accompanied by the heading "DID YOU USE THIS IUD?" and
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state failed to meet its burden of showing that the ban on advertising
directly advanced substantial state interests through the least restrictive
means available. 3 However, although it found that an attorney may not
be disciplined for the solicitation of legal business through print
advertising containing truthful, non-deceptive information and advice
about the legal rights of potential clients," the Zauderer Court upheld a
rule that required advertisements to explain the method by which
contingency fees would be computed. 5 The Court reasoned that because
informed readers his firm would represent women injured by their use of the Dalkon Shield
Intrauterine Device. See id. at 630-31.
The lawyer was charged with violating Ohio Disciplinary Rule DR 2-101(A) because the first
advertisement was "false, fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive to the public" by offering unethical
representation on a contingency-fee basis in a criminal case. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 631 (citing Ohio
Disciplinary Rule DR 2-10 1(A)). Upon review, a panel of the Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio found the advertisement deceptive for
another reason: a client might be convicted of a lesser offense than drunk driving and still be liable
for fees, a message not stated in the advertisement. See id. at 634.
Regarding the second advertisement, the lawyer was charged with violating Ohio Disciplinary
Rules 2-101(B), 2-103(A) and 2-104(A). See id. at 632-33. The lawyer allegedly violated DR 2-
101(B) because the advertisement contained an illustration, was not dignified, and contained
information that fell outside the twenty designated informational categories to which attorney
advertisements were limited. See id. at 632. Also, the advertisement failed to comply with DR 2-
101 (B)(15), which provided that any contingent fee advertisement disclose "whether percentages are
computed before or after deduction of court costs and expenses." Id. at 633. Disciplinary Rule 2-
103(A) prevents solicitation of employment of a person who did not seek legal advice. See id. at 633.
Disciplinary Rule 2-104(A) prevents a lawyer from accepting employment that results from such
unsolicited advice. See id. The Ohio disciplinary rules at issue were similar to the disciplinary rules
promulgated in the Model Code; however, certain designated informational categories differed in
DR 2-101(B). Compare Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 632-33 n.4, with Model Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 2-101(B), supra note 66 (Ohio rule somewhat more restrictive than comparable
rule in Model Code of Professional Responsibility).
103. See 471 U.S. at 644, 648-49. The Court also rejected the premise that the use of the Dal-kon
Shield illustration was tantamount to an undignified advertisement. See id. at 647. As to requiring
that advertisements be dignified, the Court stated the following:
[A]lthough the State undoubtedly has a substantial interest in ensuring that its attorneys behave
with dignity and decorum in the courtroom, we are unsure that the State's desire that attorneys
maintain their dignity in their communications with the public is an interest substantial enough
to justify the abridgment of their First Amendment rights.
Id. at 647-48. This discussion has been referred to as the "death of dignity" since it contributed to
the decision to eliminate the requirement that lawyer advertisements be dignified. Hill, supra note
18, at 403 n.189.
104. See 471 U.S. at 647. Within the context of examining commercial speech restrictions, the
U.S. Supreme Court continually has focused on the dissemination of truthful information to
consumers. See MeChesney, supra note 81, at 99.
105. 471 U.S. at 653. The Court recognized that in some situations a compulsion to speak may be
equally violable of the First Amendment as a prohibition against speech. However, as long as
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the informational value to consumers is the primary justification for
protecting commercial speech, compelled disclosure can be less
rigorously scrutinized than flat prohibitions on the dissemination of
information.
0 6
In the 1988 case of Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n,"°7 the U.S.
Supreme Court focused on the prohibition against targeted, direct-mail
solicitations and rejected the state's contention that an absolute ban on
such conduct was permissible because of the serious potential for abuse
inherent in all direct solicitation by lawyers.0 8 Noting that a targeted
direct-mailing "poses much less risk of overreaching or undue influence"
than in-person solicitation,"° the Court determined that less restrictive
means existed for regulating its potential abuses.' Lacking in direct-
mail solicitation was "'the coercive force of the personal presence of a
trained advocate' or the 'pressure on the potential client for an immediate
yes-or-no answer to the offer of representation..".
In response to the Shapero decision, the Model Rules were amended
to permit targeted mailings. While maintaining the prohibition of in-
person and live telephone contact with prospective clients, Model Rule
7.3 was changed to reflect the view that direct-mail solicitation is
disclosure requirements are reasonably related to a state's interest in preventing deception of the
consumer, the lawyer's rights receive adequate protection. See id. at 650-5 1.
106. See d The validation of this Ohio Disciplinary Rule marked the U.S. Supreme Court's first
affirmation of a bar's disciplinary action against a lawyer for violating its advertising rules since
Bates. See Maute, supra note 34, at 503.
107. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
108. See id at 473-75. The lawyer prepared a letter to send to potential clients known to be
defendants in foreclosure suits, offering to give such individuals "FREE information" on how they
could keep their homes. Id at 469. The applicable rule in Kentucky at the time was Supreme Court
of Kentucky Rule 3.135(5)(bXi), providing that:
A written advertisement may be sent or delivered to an individual addressee only if that
addressee is one of a class of persons, other than a family, to whom it is also sent or delivered at
or about the same time, and only if it is not prompted or precipitated by a specific event or
occurrence involving or relating to the addressee or addressees as distinct from the general
public.
Shapero, 486 U.S. at 470 n.2. Convinced that the principles set forth in Zauderer compelled the
deletion of this rule, the Supreme Court of Kentucky replaced Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) with Model Rule
7.3, which also prohibited targeted, direct-mail solicitation. See id at 470-71.
109. Id at 475 (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642) (internal quotations omitted). The Court went
on to note that "[u]nlike the potential client with the badgering advocate breathing down his neck,"
the recipient of a targeted letter can simply throw it away. Id. at 475-76.
110. See id. at 476.
111. IU at 475 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642).
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comparable to general mailings.'1 2 Model Rule 7.2 on "Advertising" was
also amended to reflect the changes incorporated into Model Rule 7.3.13
112. Model Rule 7.3 on "Direct Contact with Prospective Clients" was amended to provide the
following:
(a) A lawyer shall not by in-person or live telephone contact solicit professional employment
from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship
when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain.
(b) A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment from a prospective client by written or
recorded communication or by in-person or telephone contact even when not otherwise
prohibited by paragraph (a), if:
(1) the prospective client has made known to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited by
the lawyer; or
(2) the solicitation involves coercion, duress or harassment.
(c) Every written or recorded communication from a lawyer soliciting professional employment
from a prospective client known to be in need of legal services in a particular matter, and with
whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, shall include the words
"Advertising Material" on the outside envelope and at the beginning and ending of any recorded
communication ....
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.3 (1983) (amended 1989).
113. Model Rule 7.2 was amended to read as follows:
(a) Subject to the requirements of rule 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may advertise services through
public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical,
outdoor advertising, radio or television, or through written or recorded communication.
(b) A copy or recording of an advertisement or written communication shall be kept for two
years after its last dissemination along with a record of when and where it was used.
(c) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer's
services, except that a lawyer may
(1) pay the reasonable costs of advertisements or communications permitted by this
Rule;
(2) pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or legal service
organization; and
(3) pay for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17.
(d) Any communication made pursuant to this rule shall include the name of at least one lawyer
responsible for its content.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.2 (1983) (amended 1990). Model Rule 7.2 was
amended in 1989 and 1990. The 1989 amendments were in response to the Shapero decision and
subsequent amendments to Model Rule 7.3. See Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Jr., Regulation of
Lawyers: Statutes and Standards 338 (1997). The amendment in 1990 was in response to the
addition of Model Rule 1.17 regarding the sale of a law practice. See id.
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G. Central Hudson Test Clarified
One year after Shapero, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a
commercial-speech case that did not involve lawyer advertising, Board
of Trustees v. Fox."4 Reviewing the constitutionality of a university
regulation that prohibited private commercial enterprises from operating
in facilities furnished by the university," 5 the Court sought to modify the
least-restrictive-means analysis formulated in Central Hudson."6 In
essence, the Court asserted that in evaluating restrictions on commercial
speech, the last prong of the Central Hudson test could be satisfied by a
fit between the state interest and the regulation that is "reasonable," "in
proportion to the interest served," or "narrowly tailored to achieve the
desired objective.""' 7 Thus, the Fox Court gave the standard that had
been used to evaluate the constitutionality of lawyer advertising cases in
the 1980s a "more flexible meaning.
'' 18
In 1990, the Court upheld a lawyer's right to state truthfully that he
was certified as a civil-trial specialist by the National Board of Trial
Advocacy in Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Commission."9  Although the lawyer's state did not recognize
114. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
115. The specific purported violation of the school's regulation was a type of "Tupperware"
home products party held in a dormitory room. See id, at 472.
116. In evaluating the university's restriction on commercial speech, the Court relegated certain
portions of their language in Central Hudson to dicta, stating:
There are undoubtedly formulations in some of our cases that support this view-for example,
the statement in Central Hudson itself that "if the governmental interest could be served as well
by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive."
We have indeed assumed in dicta the validity of the "least-restrictive means" approach.
Id at 476.
117. Id. at 480. The Court stated that in evaluating restrictions on commercial speech, its
decisions require the following:
[A] "fit" between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends,".., a
fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best
disposition but one whose scope is "in proportion to the interest served," ... that employs not
necessarily the least restrictive means but... a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective.
Id. (citations omitted).
118. Id. at 477. The more flexible meaning for Central Hudson in Fox appeared to work in favor
ofthe state. See Hill, supra note 18, at 407-09.
119. 496 U.S. 91, 111 (1990). The lawyer's letterhead contained the following information:
"Certified Civil Trial Specialist," "By the National Board of Trial Advocacy," and "Licensed:
Illinois, Missouri, Arizona." Id. at 96. The Court considered whether the statement in the letterhead
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certification of specialties within the practice of law, 20 the Court in Peel
held that the ban on disseminating this information was constitutionally
invalid because it was "broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the
perceived evil."'' Applying a similar analysis in Ibanez v. Florida
Department of Business & Professional Regulation"2 in 1994, the Court
upheld the right of a lawyer to communicate his multiple credentials of
certified public accountant and certified financial planner, as long as
those credentials were truthful.'23
In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court employed the redefined Central
Hudson test in Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc.,'24 to uphold a Florida rule
that prohibited lawyers from mailing solicitation letters to victims and
their families for thirty days following an accident. 25 The Florida Bar's
interests in protecting injured individuals from invasive conduct by
lawyers and in preventing the erosion of confidence in the legal
was misleading, and if not, whether the "potentially misleading character of such statements" created
a state interest sufficiently substantial to justify a categorical ban on their use. Id. at 100.
120. Certification of specialties is addressed in Model Rule 7.4. Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 7.4 (1983) (amended 1994).
121. Peel, 496 U.S. at 107. The Court found the state's "concern about the possibility of
deception [was] not sufficient to rebut the constitutional presumption favoring disclosure over
concealment." Id. at I 11. "Disclosure of information such as that on petitioner's letterhead both
serves the public interest and encourages the development and utilization of meritorious certification
programs for attorneys." Id.
122. 512 U.S. 136 (1994).
123. Id. at 148-49. The Court noted that unsupported assertions by the state would not justify the
prohibition of lawyer advertising: "'Mere speculation or conjecture' will not suffice; rather the State
.must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them
to a material degree."' Id. at 143 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-771 (1993)). In
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993), the Court upheld the right of certified public accountants
(CPAs) to solicit business in person, conduct which had been forbidden under CPA regulations. Id.
at 763-64, 777.
124. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
125. See id. at 635. After a two-year study of the effects of lawyer advertising on the public, the
Florida Bar adopted Rule 4-7.4(b)(1) which provides:
A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent ... a written communication to a
prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if:
(A) the written communication concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death or
otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the person to whom the
communication is addressed or a relative of that person, unless the accident or disaster
occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing of the communication.
Id. at 620 (quoting Fla. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 4-7.4(b)(1)),
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profession were substantial, according to the Court.'26 Further, in light of
the statistical and anecdotal evidence presented by the Bar,'27 the Court
found the requirement that the challenged regulation advance a
substantial state interest was satisfied. 128 Finally, finding the Bar's
regulation to be "narrow both in scope and duration," the Court
determined that the relationship between the Bar's interests and the
means chosen to serve them withstood scrutiny under the Central
Hudson test.'29 After evaluating the Florida Bar rule under the "more
flexible meaning" of Central Hudson, the Court upheld the thirty-day
126. See id at 625. Finding the interests posited by the Florida Bar "substantial," the Court stated
the following:
We have little trouble crediting the Bar's interest as substantial. On various occasions we have
accepted the proposition that "States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions
within their boundaries, and... as part of their power to protect the public health, safety, and
other valid interests they have broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and
regulating the practice of professions." Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792
(1975) .... Our precedents also leave no room for doubt that "the protection of potential
clients' privacy is a substantial state interest." See Edenfield [v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 769
(1993)]. In other contexts, we have consistently recognized that "[t]he State's interest in
protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in
a free and civilized society." Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) .... Indeed, we have
noted that "a special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within their own walls, which the
State may legislate to protect, is an ability to avoid intrusions." Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,
484-85 (1988) ....
Went For It, 515 U.S. at 625.
127. A summary of a two-year study on lawyer advertising and solicitation, unrebutted by the
respondents, was submitted by the Florida Bar to support its contention that "the Florida public
views direct-mail solicitations in the immediate wake of accidents as an intrusion on privacy that
reflects poorly on the profession." Id. at 626. Specifically, the Court noted the following:
Fifty-four percent of the general population surveyed said that contacting persons concerning
accidents or similar events is a violation of privacy .... A random sampling of persons who
received direct-mail advertising from lawyers in 1987 revealed that 45% believed that direct-
mail solicitation is "designed to take advantage of gullible or unstable people"; 34% found such
tactics "annoying or irritating"; 26% found it "an invasion of your privacy"; and 24% reported
that it "made you angry". ... Significantly, 27% of direct-mail recipients reported that their
regard for the legal profession and for the judicial process as a whole was "lower" as a result of
receiving the direct mail.
Id. at 627 (citations omitted). While not emphasized by the Court, the above-noted data suggests that
the majority of individuals responding did not have negative reactions to this type of com-
munication, the profession, or the judicial process. Also, some data suggests that lawyer advertising
serves to elevate the image of the legal profession among the public. See Richard L Cebula, Does
Lawyer Advertising Adversely Influence the Image of Lanyers in the United States? An Alternative
Perspective and New Empirical Evidence, 27 J. Legal Stud. 503, 504 (1998).
128. See Went For It, 515 U.S. at 628.
129. Id. at 635.
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restriction. 30 The decision narrowed Shapero by suggesting that "direct
mail to those who may be suffering trauma is more like in-person
solicitation than print advertising."''
III. INDIVIDUAL STATE RULES AND THEIR
INTERPRETATIONS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE
INTERNET
The law is a self-regulated profession, 32 and within this context, the
several states operate as separate entities with their own rules governing
the lawyers of their jurisdictions. 33 As a general practice, the individual
states, with some modification, adopt and implement the ethics rules
promulgated by the ABA.1 34 However, when addressing the rules related
to lawyer advertising and solicitation, modification of the Model Rule
standards is the norm, not the exception. 31 Of the forty-three states that
130. Id.; see also infra note 151 and accompanying text.
131. See ABA Comm'n on Advertising, A Re-Examination of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Pertaining to Client Development in Light of Emerging Technologies: A White
Paper Presented for the Purpose of Discussion 12 (July 1998) [hereinafter White Paper].
132. See Stephen Rubin, The Legal Web of Professional Regulation, in Regulating the Pro-
fessions 29, 31-32 (Roger D. Blair & Stephen Rubin eds., 1980).
133. See Hill, supra note 41, at 44; Peter Krakaur, Internet Advertising: States of Disarray?, N.Y.
L.J., Sept 15, 1997, at 54. In addition, some states have special statutes that govern the conduct of
lawyers. See Hill, supra note 41, at 44-45.
134. See generally Nat'l Rep. Legal Ethics, supra note 41. The Model Rules, which use a format
of rules and comments, today represent the primary standard by which the conduct of lawyers is
measured. This notwithstanding, significant revision to the Model Rules can be expected because
the Rules are currently under review by a special commission appointed by the ABA in 1997. The
ABA, under the leadership of then president Jerome Shestack, appointed the Commission on
Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, commonly referred to as "Ethics 2000," to
undertake a review of the Model Rules. At the time of the writing of this article, Ethics 2000 had
released drafts of proposed rule changes for public discussion on March 23, 1999, November 15,
1999, and February 21, 2000. See Center for Prof'I Resp., Ethics 2000 Commission on the
Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (visited March 1, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org
/cpr/ethics2k.html>.
135. See Hazard & Hodes, supra note 94, § AP4:102, at 1259; H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr.,
Federalism and Choice of Law in the Regulation of Legal Ethics, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 73, 90 (1997)
(noting that states customized rules acting on invitation of ABA Special Committee on
Implementation of Model Rules); Geoffrey J. Ritts, Professional Responsibility and the Conflict of
Laws, 18 J. Legal Prof. 17 (1993) (noting that states that had recently adopted Model Code were
hesitant to again adopt new rules); White Paper, supra note 131, at 6 (noting that timing of Model
Rules, constitutional hurdles of provisions, and general dissatisfaction with content contributed to
significant state differences in area of lawyer communications).
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have adopted the Model Rules, 36 only nine have provisions on lawyer
communications which are identical to those in the Model Rules.137
A. State Rules on Lawyer Communications Vary
Approximately eighty percent of the states that have adopted the
Model Rules have provisions on lawyer communications that vary from
Model Rules 7.1-7.3.38 The provisions on communication that differ
from the Model Rules commonly concern standards relating to
contingent-fee disclosures and the emotional vulnerability of prospective
clients. Twenty-three states have regulatory provisions requiring the
lawyer to disclose a client's liability for costs and how the lawyer's fee is
to be computed in relation to those costs. 139 Twenty-four states have a
rule precluding retention of a client when the lawyer "knows or
reasonably should know" the mental or emotional state of the individual
makes it unlikely reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer would be
exercised. 4 ' Differences in state rules are also manifested in filing and
136. See Vermont Adopts New Ethics Code Based Largely on ABA Model Rules, 15 Laws. Man.
on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 22, at 561 (Nov. 24, 1999).
137. Only nine states have provisions on advertising and solicitation that track those in the Model
Rules. See Alaska Rules of Prof Conduct Rules 7.1-7.3 (1999); Del. Law. Rules of Prof Conduct
Rules 7.1-7.3 (1999); Haw. Rules of Prof Conduct Rules 7.1-7.3 (1999); Idaho Rules of Prof
Conduct Rules 7.1-7.3 (2000); N.H. Rules of Prof Conduct Rules 7.1-7.3 (2000); Utah Rules of
Prof Conduct Rules 7.1-7.3 (1999); Wash. Rules of Prof Conduct Rules 7.1-7.3 (1999); W. Va.
Rules of Prof Conduct Rules 7.1-7.3 (2000); Wyo. Rules of Prof Conduct Rules 7.1-7.3 (1999).
138. See ABA Comm'n on Resp. in Client Dev., Links to State Ethics Rules Governing Lawyer
Adver., Solicit. and Mktg., (visited June 6, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org/adrules/home.html>; see
also William E. Hornsby, Jr., Marketing and Legal Ethics: The Boundaries of Promoting Legal
Services 162-71 (2000).
139. Twenty-three states have provisions relating to contingent-fee disclosures. See Ariz. Rules of
Prof Conduct ER 7.1(e)(l) (2000); CaL Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 1-400, Standard 14 (1999);
Conn. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.2(e) (2000); Colo. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.1(d) (2000);
Fla. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 4-7.2(c)(4) (2000); Ga. Code of Prof. Resp. Standard 5(B) (2000);
Iowa Code of Prof Resp. DR 2-101(D)(3) (2000); Ky. Rules of Prof. Conduct Rule 7.04 (2000); La.
Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.1(a)(viii)(A) (1999); Mc Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.2(e) (2000);
Minn. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.2(e) (2000); Miss. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 1.5(c) (2000);
Mo. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 4-1.5(c) (2000); Nev. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 198(8) (1999);
N.J. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.1(a)(4) (1999); N.M. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 16-702(E)(3)
(2000); N.Y. Code of Prof Resp. DR 2-101(t) (1999); Ohio Code of Prof Resp. DR 2-101(E)(1)(c)
(2000); Okla. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.2(g) (2000); Pa. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.2(h)
(2000); R.L Rules of Prof. Conduct Rule 7.2(e) (2000); S.D. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.2(g)(1)
(1999); Tex. Disciplinary Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.04(h) (1999).
140. Twenty-four states have provisions relating to the emotional vulnerability of prospective
clients. See Ala. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.3(b)(1)(vi) (2000); Ariz. Rules of Prof Conduct ER
7.3(d)(4) (2000); Cal. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 1-400, Standard 3 (1999); Conn. Rules of Prof
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screening requirements. Fourteen states require that prior to or
concurrent with dissemination, advertisements be filed with, 4' or
screened by,'42 designated bar or court entities.
In some jurisdictions the matter of endorsements and dramatizations
in lawyer advertising is specifically addressed. States have prohibited the
use of testimonials, endorsements, 4 3 and dramatizations,'" or have
permitted their use only with disclosures.'45 Some states incorporate safe-
Conduct Rule 7.3(b)(1) (2000); D.C. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.1(b)(3) (2000); Fla. Rules of
Prof Conduct Rule 4-7.4(b)(1)(F) (2000); Ga. Code of Prof Resp. Standard 6(D)(5) (1999); 11l.
Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.3(b)(1) (2000); Ind. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.1(c)(6) (1999); La.
Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.1(a)(viii)(A) (1999); Me. Code of Prof Resp. Rule 3.9(b)(6) (2000);
Md. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.3(b)(1) (2000); Mass. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 2-103(B)(1)
(1999); Mo. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.3(c)(1) (1999); Mont. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.3(a)
(2000); Neb. Code of Prof Resp. DR 2-104(B)(1) (1999); N.M. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 16-
701(C)(3) (2000); N.Y. Code of Prof Resp. DR 2-103(a)(2)(iv) (1999); N.D. Rules of Prof Conduct
Rule 7.1(b)(3) (1999); Or. Code of Prof Resp. DR 2-101(D)(1) (1999); Pa. Rules of Prof Conduct
Rule 7.3(b)(1) (2000); R.L Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.3(b)(2)(e) (2000); Va. Rules of Prof
Conduct Rule 7.3(a)(2) (2000); Wis. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.3(d)(1) (1999). This language is
largely the result of language used in a proposed draft for Model Rule 7.3 that the ABA rejected. See
Hill, supra note 41, at 110. Following the appointment of a special commission by the ABA in 1977
to examine the Model Code, a number of proposed drafts of the new Model Rules were formulated
and circulated by the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards. See id. The
original language of Model Rule 7.3, as proposed by the Commission (referred to as the "Kutak
Commission" because of its chairman, Robert J. Kutak), contained language relating to the physical,
mental, or emotional state of a client. See id. The ABA subsequently rejected this language, but it
was adopted by a number of states as they reviewed and implemented versions of the Model Rules.
See id.
141. Twelve states have advertisement-filing requirements. See Ala. Rules of Prof Conduct ER
7.2 (2000); Fla. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 4-7.4(b)(2)(C) (2000); Ind. Rules of Prof Conduct
Rule 7.3(c) (1999); Ky. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.05(b) (1999); Miss. Rules of Prof Conduct
Rule 7.2(p) (2000); N.M. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 16-707(B) (2000); N.Y. Code of Prof Resp.
DR 2-101(F)(1) (1999); R.L Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.3(b)(1)(b) (2000); S.C. Rules of Prof
Conduct Rule 7.3(d) (1999); Tenn. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 2-10I(D)-(F) (2000); Tex.
Disciplinary Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.07(a), (b) (1999); Wis. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule
7.3(b) (1999). Arizona and Iowa make such a rule applicable only to direct-mail solicitations. See
Ariz. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.3(c) (2000); Iowa Code of Prof Resp. DR 2-I01(A)(4)(d)
(2000).
142. Four states have screening requirements. See Fla. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 4-
7.4(b)(2)(C); Ky. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.05(b)(2); N.M. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 16-
707(E) (2000); Tenn. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 2-101(F) (2000).
143. Five states prohibit the use of testimonials or endorsements. See Fla. Rules of Prof Conduct
Rule 4-7.2(b)(1)(E) (2000); Ind. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.3(d)(3) (1999); Nev. Rules of Prof
Conduct Rule 195(4) (1999); N.M. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 16-701(A)(2) (2000); Ohio Code of
Prof Resp. DR 2-101(A)(3) (2000).
144. Three states prohibit dramatizations. See Ark Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.2(e) (2000);
Miss. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.2(e) (2000); Nev. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 196(5) (1999).
145. Seven states permit the use of testimonials or endorsements, however, disclosures are
required. See Cal. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 1-400, Standard 2 (1999); La. Rules of Prof Conduct
Rule 7.1(a)(vi) (1999); Mo. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.1(g) (1999); Or. Code of Prof Resp. DR
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harbor provisions in their regulations, which list permitted information
presumed to be in compliance with the rules. 4 6 Other states require
disclaimers,'47 for example: "The hiring of a lawyer is an important
decision that should not be based solely upon advertisements. Before you
decide, ask us to send you free written information about our
qualifications and experience.""' Restrictions on direct mail also vary,'49
2-101(A)(b) (1999); Pa. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.2(e) (2000); Va. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule
7.1(4) (2000); Wis. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.1(a)(4) (1999). For instance, California requires
language to the effect that "this testimonial or endorsement does not constitute a guarantee, warranty
or prediction regarding the outcome of your legal matter." Cal. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 1-400,
Standard 2; Seven states permit dramatizations but require disclosure. See Cal. Rules of Prof
Conduct Rule 1-400, Standard 13 (1999); La. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.1(a)(vi); Mo. Rules of
Prof. Conduct Rule 7.1(g); Or. Code of Prof Resp. DR 2-101(A)(6); S.D. Rules of Prof Conduct
Rule 7.1(c)(12) (1999); Va. Rules of Prof. Conduct Rule 7.1(a)(4); Wis. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule
7.1(a)(4). In four states actors portraying lawyers or clients is either prohibited or must be disclosed.
See Iowa Code of Prof Resp. DR 2-101(3)(5) (2000); Nev. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 196(2)
(1999); Pa. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.2(f) (2000); S.D. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.2(h)
(1999).
146. Safe-harbor provisions are incorporated into the rules of 13 states. See Ariz. Rules of Prof
Conduct ER 7.1(d) (2000); Conn. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.2(h) (2000); Fla. Rules of Prof.
Conduct Rule 4-7.2(c)(10) (2000); Ind. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.1(b) (1999); Iowa Code of
Prof Resp. DR 2-101(C) (2000); Ky. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.05(1)(a) (1999); Miss. Rules of
Prof Conduct Rule 7.2(n) (2000); Nev. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 196(12) (1999); N.M. Rules of
Prof. Conduct Rule 16-702(D) (2000); N.Y Code of Prof Resp. DR 2-101(C) (1999); S.D. Rules of
Prof Conduct Rule 7.2(o (1999); Tenn. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 2-101(B) (2000); Tex.
Disciplinary Rules ofProf Conduct Rule 7.07(d) (1999).
147. Ten states require that disclaimers be included in solicitation materials. See Ala. Rules of
Prof Conduct Rule 7.2(e); Fla. Rules of Prof. Conduct Rule 4-7.3(b); Iowa Code of Prof. Resp. DR
2-101(B)(4)(c) (2000); Miss. Rules of Prof. Conduct Rule 7.2(d) (2000); N.J. Rules of Prof Conduct
Rule 7.3(b)(4)(ii) (1999); N.M. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 16-702(E) (2000); Okla. Rules of Prof
Conduct Rule 7.2(e)(1) (2000); S.C. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.3(c)(3) (1999); Tenn. Rules of
Prof Conduct Rule 2-101(N) (2000); Tex. Disciplinary Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.05(b)(2)
(1999).
148. Fla. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 4-7.2(d) (1991); see also Wendy R. Leibowitz, The Sins of
Law Firm Web Sites: Are Ethical, Dignified Sites Dull?, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 18, 1997, at B6.
149. Fourteen states have restrictions on direct-mail solicitations. States may limit the size and
color of print of required labels, restrict postings to regular mail, or require disclosures relating to
how the lawyer learned of a specific legal need. See Ala. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.3(b)(2)(ii)-
(v); Ariz. Rules of Prof Conduct ER 7.3(b) (2000); Ark Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.3(b) (2000);
Colo. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.1(c) (2000); Fla. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 4-7A(b)(2)(G)
(2000); Iowa Code of Prof Resp. DR 2-101(B)(4)(d) (2000); La. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule
7.2(b)(iii) (1999); Nev. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 197(2), (3) (1999); N.J. Rules of Prof Conduct
Rule 7.3(b)(4) (1999); N.M. Rules of Prof. Conduct Rule 16-702(E) (2000); Okla. Rules of Prof
Conduct Rule 7.2(f) (2000); Or. Code of Prof Resp. DR 2-101(H) (1999); Tenn. Rules of Prof
Conduct Rule 2-101(N); Tex. Disciplinary Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.05(b)(2). Disclaimers are
also required in New Jersey and Oklahoma. See N.J. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.3(b)(4)(ii); Okla.
Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.2(e)(1).
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and responding to the U.S. Supreme Court's Went For It decision, 5'
some states include a waiting period for solicitation in mass disasters or
personal-injury accidents.' 5' With greater numbers of lawyers using the
Internet as a means of communication, state-by-state regulation and the
resulting jurisdictional differences have become increasingly problematic
for lawyers attempting to comply with applicable ethics rules.
A lawyer disseminating information on the Internet necessarily
crosses state lines and national boundaries within the context of the
communication. Concerned with following the rules on lawyer publicity
and avoiding related problems, lawyers want to know what rules are
applicable and how they should be interpreted. The Model Rules,
initially adopted in 1983,152 were developed and crafted within the
context of print and broadcast media.'53 Although the Model Rules do
not expressly address lawyer communications through World Wide Web
sites or other uses of the Internet, recently released public-discussion
drafts with proposed changes to the Model Rules directly address
electronic communications.154 With few exceptions, state ethics rules
150. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
151. Seven states impose a time period during which solicitation may not be made for mass
disaster or personal-injury accidents. Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, New Jersey, and
Louisiana have a 30-day waiting period. See Ala. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.3(b)(I)(i) (2000);
Ark Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.2(c) (2000); Colo. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.3 (c) (2000);
Fla. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 4-7.4(b)(I) (2000); N.J. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.3(b)(4); La.
Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7. l(a)(viii)(A) (1999). A 45-day waiting period has been implemented
in Nevada. See Nev. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 198(8) (1999).
152. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
153. See Krakaur, supra note 133, at 54.
154. See Center for Prof. Resp., supra note 134. Since the inception of the Model Rules in 1983,
there have been 19 amendments; six of these have been added to the section governing advertising
and solicitation. See White Paper, supra note 131, at 6.
At the time this Article was written, Ethics 2000 released proposed changes to Model Rules 7.2
and 7.3, directly addressing electronic communications. The proposed rules, released for public
discussion on February 21, 2000, would amend Model Rule 7.2(a) to state: "Subject to the
requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may advertise services through public media, or through
written, recorded or electronic communication." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Proposed
Rule 7.2 (2000). Comment 3 to Proposed Model Rule 7.2 would add the following language:
Similarly world wide websites can be an important source of information about legal services
and communication by electronic mail is permitted by this Rule. But see Rule 7.3(a) for the
prohibition against the solicitation of a prospective client through a real-time electronic
conversation that is not initiated by the prospective client.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Proposed Rule 7.2 cmt.3. Proposed Model Rule 7.3 adds "real-
time electronic contact" to the prohibited communications in Rule 7.3(a) and Proposed Rule 7.3(c)
requires that targeted electronic communications soliciting professional employment be marked
"Advertising Material." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Proposed Rule 7.3. Comment I to
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give little guidance on use of the Internet by lawyers. While the rules of
some jurisdictions refer to advertising via electronic media'55 and a
handful address the Internet directly,'56 the application of existing rules
to the use of the Internet by lawyers largely has been left to ethics
opinions by the individual states.'57
B. Communication on the Internet as Commercial Speech
In contrast to a decade ago, most lawyers and law firms in this
country now have Web sites.' The home pages established by these
lawyers and their firms vary greatly, from simple straightforward text to
vibrant graphics and pictures.'59 Most sites contain biographical
information about the lawyers, with information about the firm and its
practice."' Some sites contain general information on designated legal
topics and provide "hypertext" links to other material. 6 ' A firm might
provide links to files it maintains, such as publications by its lawyers, or
link to sites outside the firm, such as independent legal research
materials.'62 Law-firm Web sites often include expedited Ways to contact
the firm by e-mail and invite visitors to enter their names in a "guest
book."'63 Many large firms also post recruiting information, such as
starting salaries and profiles of their primary practice areas and branch
offices."
Proposed Rule 7.5 would add the following language: "[a] lawyer or law firm may also be
designated by a distinctive website address or comparable professional designation." Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Proposed Rule 7.5 cmt. I.
155. Eight states' rules reference electronic media. See Ariz. Rules of Prof Conduct ER 7.1(q)
(2000); Conn. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.2(d) (2000); Ga. Code of Prof. Resp. DR 2-101(B)(6)
(1999); Iowa Code of Prof Resp. DR 2-101(B)(5) (2000); Miss. Rules of Prof. Conduct Rule 7.5
(2000); Nev. Rules of Prof. Conduct Rule 196(2) (1999); Vt. Rules of Prof. Conduct Rule 7.2(a)
(1999); Va. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.1(b) (2000). Massachusetts, which recently adopted the
Model Rules, expands the definition of "legal directory" to include "an electronic or computer-
accessed directory." See Mass. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 7.2(a) (1999).
156. See infra notes 224-33 and accompanying text.
157. See Internet, supra note 1, at 81:552.
158. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
159. See Internet, supra note 1, at 81:554.
160. See Hansen, supra note 13, at 238.
161. See Internet, supra note 1, at 81:554.
162. See id
163. See Hansen, supra note 13, at 238.
164. See id.; see also Beth Berselli, Firms Find Web Sites Attract Clients, Recruits, Prestige,
Washington Post, Sept. 22, 1997, at F7.
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An initial question to be addressed when considering the applicability
of state ethics rules to the Internet is whether a lawyer's communication
constitutes commercial speech.1 65 Commercial speech is speech whose
purpose is "to [do] no more than propose a transaction."'" However, the
regulations on advertising and solicitation that impose restrictions on
commercial speech are limited to speech of that kind. 67 If a law firm or
lawyer Web site is not commercial speech, it is exempt from such state
regulation and entitled to greater First Amendment protection. 68 In
Texans Against Censorship, Inc. v. State Bar,169 the district court
considered whether Texas ethics rules on lawyer advertising and
solicitation applied to an advertisement placed by a lawyer proposing a
new method for judicial selection. 7 Focusing on the content of the
lawyer advertisement rather than its motivation, the district court noted
that "it is only when the message conveyed by the communication
suggests to the public, or a specific individual, that the lawyer's
professional services are available for hire that the communication must
meet the requirement of the amended rules."'' The district court
determined that the advertisement did not propose a commercial
transaction, even though the lawyer admitted that he hoped it would
generate business.'72
Using a content-based approach when considering law firm and
lawyer Web sites, it is unclear if the information contained on lawyer
home pages should be labeled "commercial." While it may be the intent
of lawyers to promote their practice when establishing Web sites, a great
deal of the material contained on a home page may be informational in
nature, and not be commercial speech.'73 Furthermore, it may be difficult
to discern the distinction between commercial speech and
noncommercial expression, 74 or the commercial and noncommercial
165. See Hornsby, supra note 9.
166. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 422 (1993) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983)). But see supra note 46.
167. See William E. Hornsby, Jr., Ethics Rules for Ads May Cover Web Sites, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 29,
1996, at C1, 9; White Paper, supra note 13 1, at 20.
168. See Keith Forkin, Web Pages as Lawyer Advertising (on file with author).
169. 888 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
170. See id. at 1343.
171. Id. at 1344.
172. Seeid.
173. See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
174. See Texans Against Censorship, 888 F. Supp. at 1345.
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speech may be intertwined. In Riley v. National Federation of the
Blind,75 the U.S. Supreme Court stated that when "component parts of a
single speech are inextricably intertwined, we cannot parcel out the
speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to another
phrase."'76 The Court extended full First Amendment protection to such
speech.
77
Although commercial and noncommercial speech might coexist on a
home page, opinion differs as to whether it is necessarily "inextricably
intertwined." Purely informational portions of home pages are not
considered commercial speech, but biography, specialty and e-mail
sections on a home page usually are. 7 1 One school of thought posits that
commercial and noncommercial speech on a Web site can be
separated.'79 Another school of thought views a home page as a single
entity with interconnected parts, providing "no way for a law firm to
separate the commercial and noncommercial sections.. . ."o If the latter
is true, an argument can be made that home pages should not be subject
to the rules that regulate commercial speech. Following traditional legal
mandates, one can argue that the noncommercial aspects of a home page
should provide the site with full First Amendment protection.
In light of today's technology, the legal community is faced with the
realization that the ability to "separate" speech, in the traditional sense,
may no longer be the appropriate factor to consider when considering
First Amendment protection for speech. Just as emerging technologies
pose problems for our current regulatory structure,' traditional judicial
tests developed within the perspective of broadcast and print media may
prove to be ineffective for innovative forms of communication. Rather
than considering whether speech can be separated, the nature of a Web
site may be such that if the site is established by a for-profit entity, such
as a law firm, its commercial aspects should trump its noncommercial
components. The commercial aspects of a site would result in ethical
175. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
176. Id. at 796.
177. See id.
178. See Forkin, supra note 168.
179. See White Paper, supra note 131, at 23.
180. See Forkin, supra note 168. A possible solution to the problem of overlapping commercial
and noncommercial speech on home pages is for a law firm to use two separate home pages,
ensuring that the "informational" home page does not advertise legal services and can be accessed
without contacting the home page containing legal advertising. See id.
181. See infra Part IV.
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rules being applied to the content of the entire site, rather than the
noncommercial aspects of a Web site elevating the commercial aspects to
full First Amendment protection.
C. State Ethics Rules that Are Applicable to Internet Communications
State ethics opinions are often advisory and usually respond to fact-
specific questions. A number of states have considered fact-specific
matters relating to emerging technologies and thus far have uniformly
held their rules to be applicable to lawyer communications on the
Internet. 182 Interestingly, most of these decisions have been made with
little or no concern for the characterization of speech as commercial or
noncommercial.
In Pennsylvania, a member of the Pennsylvania Bar Association's
Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility informed a
law firm that if a Web site contains communications about a lawyer or
the lawyer's services, it constitutes lawyer advertising and is subject to
the Rules of Professional Conduct.13 Similarly, an opinion of the Iowa
Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct reasoned that
since lawyer and law-firm home pages or Web sites are "generally
designed to promote the firm and to sell legal services of the firm and
constitute advertising," there must be compliance with the rules
governing lawyer advertising." 4 Alabama's Disciplinary Commission of
182. See Peter Krakaur, Ethical Considerations for Internet Acceptable Use Policies, (on file with
author).
183. See Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof. Resp., Advisory Op. 96-17
(1996). The opinion goes on to state that a Web page is in the public domain and qualifies as "public
media," similar to newspapers, radio, or television. See id. Furthermore, any content permissible
under Rules 7.1-7.6 should also be permissible on a Web page. See id.
184. See Iowa Sup. Ct., Bd. of Prof. Resp., Formal Op. 96-1, [1998 Transfer Vol.] Nat'l Rep.
Legal Ethics (Univ. Pub. Am.) IA: opinions 14 (1996) [hereinafter Iowa Formal Op.]. The opinion
states that mandated disclosures "must be located and set forth in full (and not merely by hyper-text
link) on the first page or screen of the lawyer's home page or web site and in any location where
there appears biographical matter other than the name, address, telephone and fax numbers for the
lawyer or the firm." Id. An exception to requiring conformity with these Rules is the inter-exchange
of legal information with clients, another law firm or other members of the web site firm. See id.
The opinion went on to state:
[W]ith sensitive material to be transmitted on e-mail counsel must have written
acknowledgment by client of the risk of violation of DR 4-101 which acknowledgment includes
consent for communication thereof on the Internet or nonsecure Intranet or other forms of
proprietary networks, or it must be encrypted or protected by password/firewall or other
generally accepted equivalent security system.
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the Office of General Counsel, in sweeping language, released an ethics
opinion stating that "any information made available to the public about
a lawyer or a lawyer's services on the Internet or private on-line services
is subject to regulation under the rules on advertising and solicitation."'' 5
While states have uniformly held their rules to be applicable to lawyer
communications on the Internet, they differ on exactly which rules relate
to given situations. For instance, the State Bar of Arizona's Committee
on the Rules of Professional Conduct took the position that a firm's Web
site is considered a communication about a lawyer that would be subject
to the ethical requirements of Rules 7.1-7.5."6 The South Carolina
Id. One year later this language was amended to delete "or it must be encrypted or protected by
password/firewall or other generally accepted equivalent security system" in favor of the following
language: "to be protected as agreed between counsel and client." Id. at 42. In responding to an
inquiry regarding required disclosures, the Board gave the following guidance:
(1) A finn cannot advertise areas of practice, only lawyers can;
(2) Only lawyers who have filed a report of compliance pursuant to DR 2-105(A)(4) may
advertise areas of practice;
(3) Only three areas of practice may be advertised by a lawyer,
(4) If the term "general practice" is advertised with "areas of practice" it must be in accordance
with DR 2-105(B);
(5) If areas of practice are advertised they must be preceded by the words "practicing primarily
in" or "practice limited to"....
Iowa Formal Op., [1998 Transfer Vol.] Nat'l Rep. Legal Ethics (Univ. Pub. Am.) at 15 (citations
omitted). In response to an inquiry on what constitutes "sensitive material," the Board stated that
"what is considered 'sensitive material' is a question of fact to be determined on a case by case
basis." Id at 41.
185. Alabama Bar Ass'n, Disciplinary Comm'n, Ethics Op. 96-07, [1998 Transfer Vol.] Nat'l Rep.
Legal Ethics (Univ. Pub. Am.) AL: opinions 24 (1996) (emphasis added). "It makes no difference
whether it is done through a web page, a bulletin board, or via unsolicited electronic mail. Any
advertising or promotional activity transmitted through the use of a computer is subject to regulation
like any other form of lawyer advertising." Id.
186. State Bar of Ariz., Comm. on Rules of Prof. Conduct, Formal Op. 97-04 (Apr. 7, 1997). In
addition to noting the applicability of the ethics rules to firm Web sites, the State Bar of Arizona's
Committee on the Rules of Professional Conduct provided answers to ten other frequently presented
issues on lawyers using computerized communications (bracketed explanations added):
(2) If a law firm has offices in many states, must the firm comply with Arizona ethics rules if
the firm has either an office in Arizona or attorneys admitted to practice in Arizona?
Yes. [Opinion notes affirmative response even if advertisement appears, electron-
ically, inside and outside of state].
(3) Can a "web site" use a tradename as the law firm name?
No. [Arizona rules prohibit use of trade names but opinion notes domain names are not
subject to this limitation].
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Ethics Advisory Committee informed a lawyer that it was permissible for
him to maintain a presence on electronic media for the purpose of
discussing legal topics generally, but the restrictions in Model Rules 7.1-
7.3 must be followed for communications, advertising, and direct contact
with prospective clients. 8 7 An advisory ethics opinion of the Board of
(4) Can a lawyer mention either in a web site or simply in responding to a question in a "chat
room" that he or she specializes in water law?
No. [Arizona rules on certification of specializations must be followed and water law is
not an area certified as specialty].
(5) Is it a violation of ER 7.3 to contact a prospective client directly via e-mail if you know that
the person needs legal representation for a particular matter?
Maybe. [Although application may create dilemma, there must be compliance with ER
7.3 disclosure obligations; communication with potential client in cyberspace should
not be considered either prohibited telephone or in-person contact].
(6) Should lawyers answer specific legal questions posed in "chat rooms" or "news groups"?
Probably not. [Unless question is of general nature and advice is not fact-specific,
inability to screen for potential conflicts and possibility of disclosing confidential
information is problematic].
(7) May a lawyer join an on-line lawyer referral service?
Probably not. [Referral service must be "operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar
association" and currently no on-line services are so approved].
(8) Should lawyers communicate with existing clients, via e-mail, about confidential matters?
Maybe. [Inadvertent disclosure of confidential information is concern].
(9) May lawyers place on-line intake forms for prospective clients on their web sites and, if so,
may the client respond via the web site?
Probably. [Sending forms is not problematic but completed forms should not be
transmitted electronically to avoid possible inadvertent disclosures of confidential
information].
(10) Do lawyers need to submit a copy of their web sites to the State Bar and the Supreme Court
pursuant to ER 7.3?
Probably not. [Web sites are not sent directly to prospective clients but are designed to
provide general information about law firm].
(11) Do lawyers need to keep a copy of their web sites and any changes that they make to their
web sites pursuant to ER 7.1(o)?
Yes. [Copies of web sites, and material substantive changes, need to be kept in
retrievable format for three years after dissemination].
Id.
187. See South Carolina Bar Ass'n, Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 94-27, [1995 Transfer Vol.]
Nat'l Rep. Legal Ethics (Univ. Pub. Am.) SC: opinions 58 (1995). A South Carolina Bar member
with a physical disability wished to approach on-line services about setting up an electronic law
office for providing legal information and advice to persons across the United States. See id. The
Committee divided the inquiry into two parts: first, providing legal information generally, such as
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Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee stated
that ethical rules regarding publicity are applicable to postings on the
World Wide Web. 8' However, the Tennessee opinion distinguished
these permissible postings, to which readers choose to have access, from
general postings to news groups on the Internet, which it viewed as akin
to impermissible forms of solicitation." 9 Likening a law-firm home page
to a yellow-page telephone directory or firm brochure, an Illinois State
Bar Association Advisory Opinion on Professional Conduct found Rules
7.1 and 7.2 to be applicable, but not Rule 7.3, since such materials are
not directed to specific recipients."9 Similarly, a Michigan opinion held
that posted information on the Internet must comply with the mandates
through educational and informational programs; and second, representing clients via electronic
media. See it The Committee found no problem with participating in general discussions on legal
topics via electronic media. See i& The Committee raised several concerns with the second matter,
however, regarding communications, conflicts of interest, confidentiality, and unauthorized practice
of law. See id. Included in the Committee opinion was the following:
Since a public advertisement on electronic media is necessarily available to a universal
audience, the attorney will be placing advertising designed to reach potential clients in
jurisdictions in which he is not admitted to practice. Under Rule 7.2(a), any notice or
advertisement disseminated by public media must clearly identify the geographic limitations of
the lawyer's practice, so that it is clear that he may not practice law except in those states in
which he is admitted to practice.
Id. at 59. In 1997, the Ethics Advisory Committee re-examined Advisory Opinion 94-27 "in light of
the current state of technology." See South Carolina Comm., Advisory Op. 97-08, [1997 Transfer
Vol.] Nat'l Rep. Legal Ethics (Univ. Pub. Am.) SC: opinions 33 (1997). The opinion, however, was
limited to the question of confidential communications via e-mail. See i&.
188. See Tennessee Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof. Resp., Advisory Op. 95-A-570 (1995).
189. See id. The Board opined that general postings to news groups on the Internet often arrive on
a user's screen unsolicited. See id. The user in essence pays for these communications since most
Internet users pay access charges. See id. The Board condemned such communications by likening
them to telephone calls or direct personal solicitations. See id As to responding to a posting on the
Internet asking for legal advice, the Board noted in an opinion released later that year that the rules
on advertising and publicity are generally inapplicable, but other provisions of the rules do apply,
such as those relating to confidentiality, competence, and conflicts of interest. See Tennessee Sup.
Ct, Bd. of Prof. Resp., Advisory Op. 95-A-576 (1995).
In 1997 Tennessee was the first jurisdiction in the United States to sanction a lawyer for an
Internet advertising practice by suspending his license to practice for one year. See Tennessee
Disciplines Lawyerfor Internet E-mail Campaign, 13 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA), at
218 (July 23, 1997). Laurence A. Canter attempted to attract clients by transmitting unsolicited e-
mall advertisements to more than 10,000 Internet users and on-line discussion groups. Adopting a
hearing committee's findings, the Tennessee Supreme Court found that Cantor intruded on the
recipients' privacy and damaged the legal profession's reputation by compelling the recipients to pay
for unwanted advertisements. See id.
190. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Advisory Op. 96-10 (1997). The opinion indicates that participation
in an electronic bulletin board or chat group could call Rule 7.3 into play when a lawyer initiates an
unrequested contact with a specific person or group. Id.
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of Rules 7.1 and 7.2, but not with Rule 7.3, since it is in the nature of
general material with which the user initiates contact.'
Taking a slightly different tack, the Massachusetts Bar Association
Committee on Professional Ethics indicated that because Web sites do
not constitute the "solicitation of professional employment," the labeling
and retention requirements of the rules are not applicable.'92 Similarly,
191. See State Bar of Mich., Informal Op. RI-276 (1996) (visited Apr. 18, 2000) <http://www.
michbar.org/opinions/ethics/numberedopinions/ri-276.htm> [hereinafter Michigan Ethics Opinion].
Home pages, libraries, and chat rooms were examples of posted information that can be accessed by
Internet users. See id. Posted information was distinguished from Internet communications which are
initiated, such as e-mail. See id.
192. Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. 1997-130 (1997) (visited Apr. 18,
2000) <http://www.legalethics.com/states/1997_130.htm>. The Committee considered this matter
within the context of an inquiry by the Massachusetts Lesbian and Gay Bar Association (MLGBA),
asking whether it could establish a Web site which would contain a membership directory accessible
by the public in making the selection of a lawyer. Three types of membership listings were presented
which would be available at the preference of the listing attorney:
Option 1: An abbreviated version of the particular attomey's listing in the MLGBA's current
print membership directory, which typically includes the member's name, finn name, address,
telephone and telecopier number, admission information, and practice areas, as well as a direct
connection or "hot link" to the attorney's electronic mailbox address, if he or she possesses one;
or
Option 2: A hot-link to the particular attorney's own existing World Wide Web site, if he or she
possesses one; or
Option 3: A hot-link to an individualized World Wide Web site created and maintained for the
particular attorney by MLGBA personnel for an additional reasonable fee. It is anticipated that
such individual web-sites will be more extensive, more attractive and more flexible than the
standard directory listings envisioned under Option 1, noted above.
Id. In addressing questions posed by the MLGBA with respect to these options, the Committee
responded that Option 1 did not represent any significant departure from the long-accepted practice
of publishing bar directories, subject only to the non-deception, source limitations, and "limitation
on practice" provisions of the rules. The Committee further responded that with respect to Option 2,
the MLGBA would have no greater obligation to police the content of individual attorney Web sites
than it would to police the content of participating members' firm brochures in MLGBA written bar
directories. The Committee went on to state the following:
The Committee further believes that individual attorney web-sites need not be labeled
"advertising" pursuant to DR 2-103(C)(1). Entering an attorney web-site in this context is an
intentional act on the part of the prospective client that best can be analogized to contacting or
physically visiting the attorney in order to obtain further information. Lawyers' responses to
such inquiries traditionally have not been regarded as "solicitation" of professional employment
targeted or "directed to [a] prospective client," and therefore do not qualify as "advertising"
under DR 2-103(C)(1).
Id. Responding to additional specific queries, the Committee stated that a bar directory, whether
written or computerized, is not necessarily a lawyer referral service. Unlike a lawyer referral service,
which anticipates the actual referral of designated participating attorneys, a bar directory compiles
information to be used in a prospective client's self-selection of a lawyer. See id.
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the New York County Lawyers' Association Committee on Professional
Ethics held that advertising on the Internet is permissible as long as it
conforms with the applicable disciplinary rules, 93 but stated that on-line
directory information need not comply with the rules' filing
requirements since such requirements apply only to distribution by
"means 'other than by radio, television, directory, newspaper, magazine
or other periodical.""" North Carolina opinions held that a lawyer may
participate in a directory of lawyers on the Internet, pay a fee for the
193. See New York County Law. Ass'n, Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. 921 (1997). A special-
interest organization of lawyers wanted to include an icon for an Attorney Referral Board on its
home page. See id. The Internet service provider would have included this service at no additional
charge for six months, in hopes that subscribing attorneys would make use of the Internet provider's
services. See id. The user would be directed to a list of subject areas where a description of the law,
along with a list of attorneys practicing in the described area, would be displayed. See id. The
opinion states that an Internet directory listing of attorneys does not differ from other directory
listings of attorneys published by an organization. See 1d1 It does note, however, that "'Attorney
Referral Board' is potentially misleading, in that it may indicate that the participating attorneys have
in some way been recommended by the sponsoring organization." Id. Noting that "[a] lawyer may
not pay for a recommendation of employment," the opinion goes on to state that "[n]othing of value
will pass to the provider as a result of any employment generated by a listing, and any
recommendations that are made are those of the sponsoring organization, which has provided the
listings as a service to its members." Id.
In contrast to the proposition described in New York, a Nebraska State Bar Association Advisory
Committee reviewed an attorney request for an opinion regarding participation in a lawyer-referral
program that is "for profit" Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, Advisory Comm., Advisory Op. 95-3, [1996
Transfer Vol.] Nat'l Rep. Legal Ethics (Univ. Pub. Am.) NE: opinions 13 (1995). The referral
program is a service that can be accessed at on-line shopping malls to identify a limited number of
participating lawyers who have paid a fee (between $375 and $950 for a six month period) to be
included in the directory. See id. The Nebraska Committee regarded this practice as failling within
the prohibition that condemns giving value for the recommendation of legal services under DR 2-
103(A). See id. Quoting from a previous opinion, the Nebraska Committee restated the following:
The provisions of DR 2-103(A) clearly allow a lawyer to pay for advertising or written
communications generated by the lawyer ("self-advertising"). It is also clear that a lawyer may
pay the "usual charges" of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other legal service
organization. It is the opinion of the Committee, however, that paying a second party for the
second party's advertising and promotional expenses, plus an administration fee, falls squarely
within the prohibition against giving "anything of value to a person for recommending the
lawyer's services" and does not fall within the exception for advertising expenses.
Id. (quoting Op. 89-3 (1989)).
194. New York County Law. Ass'n, Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. 921 (citing DR 2-101(F)(I))
(emphasis added). More recently, the Nassau County, New York Ethics Committee also determined
that the advertisement copy-retention and filing requirements were not applicable to banner
advertisements on the Internet since Internet advertisements and Web sites are more like broadcast
commercials or published advertisements than private written solicitations. See Nassau County
(N.Y.) Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. 99-3 (1999).
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listing,'95 and display truthful information about the lawyer's services on
a Web site provided there is compliance with applicable rules.'96 To that
end, the North Carolina Committee stated that compliance with the
retention requirement was necessary and "may be achieved by printing a
hard copy of all screens on the Web site as launched and subsequently
printing hard copies of any material changes in the format or content of
the Web site."' 97
D. Status of Electronic Communication Components Varies
Just as promulgated rules and their specific applicability to electronic
communications vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, there appears to
be state-by-state variation in evaluating the status of components of the
Internet (for example, home pages, newsgroups, e-mail, and chat
groups). For instance, it is generally held that lawyers may post
information about the availability of their services to a home page or a
newsgroup for interested people to read.'98 Newsgroup postings are
routinely analogized to newspaper or magazine advertisements, and must
195. North Carolina State Bar, Proposed Op. RPC 241, [1997 Transfer Vol.] Nat'l Rep. Legal
Ethics (Univ. Pub. Am.) NC: opinions 15 (1996). The situation being reviewed was the development
of an Internet site by a private company to be known as the National Attorney Locator. It was
described as follows:
The site will contain an electronic directory of lawyers. The directory will include listings for
lawyers from across the United States. These listings can be searched by lawyers' geographic
location and areas of legal practice. Each listing will include the name of the lawyer or law firm,
the name of a contact person at the firm, address, phone number, fax number, e-mail address,
and areas of practice. Lawyers must apply and pay a fee to be listed on the directory. The
Internet site will have a hypertext section on "Choosing an Attorney" which includes a
statement that the National Attorney Locator is not a referral service but an electronic directory.
Id. The Committee stated that information contained within these listing must be truthful and not
misleading. See id. To avoid being misleading, the listing should state where the lawyer is licensed
to practice law and the location of the lawyer's principal office. See id. Rules relating to
specialization also must be followed. See id.
196. See North Carolina State Bar, Proposed Op. RPC 239, [1996 Transfer Vol.] Nat'l Rep. Legal
Ethics (Univ. Pub. Am.) NC: opinions 9 (1996).
197. Id. The opinion goes on to note that "[t]hese hard copies should be retained for two years
together with a record of when the screens were used on the Internet." Id. The Arizona Committee
also determined that retention of copies of Web sites was necessary, along with copies of material
changes. State Bar of Ariz., Comm. on Rules of Prof. Conduct, Formal Op. 97-04, at 6 (Apr. 7,
1997). However, copies of Web sites did not need to be submitted to the state bar because they are
"designed to provide general information about a law firm and are not sent directly to certain
prospective clients .... Id.
198. See generally supra notes 183-97 and accompanying text.
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comply with the applicable rules on lawyer advertising.' Making
information available on a home page or newsgroup casts the lawyer in a
role that is initially passive, with the public being free to access and act
upon the available information. However, as a lawyer's conduct becomes
less passive, such as when a lawyer uses e-mail to communicate with
prospective clients,2"° opinion varies on how this conduct should be
characterized.
A Michigan ethics opinion found the use of e-mail permissible,
likening e-mail to a facsimile transmission or post card.2"' In contrast, a
Tennessee ethics opinion likened promotional e-mail to a telephone call,
which triggered the prohibition against telephone contact in Model Rule
7.3.2'2 The Tennessee opinion reasoned that a promotional e-mail posting
to newsgroups resembles a phone call because it imposes extra access
charges on users, intrudes on their privacy, and cannot be easily
ignored. 3 More typically, unsolicited e-mail messages sent to
prospective clients have been likened to letters, although its been noted
that e-mail reaches potential clients more quickly than the post and may
have a greater impact on the recipient."
199. See, e.g., Brian G. Gilpin, Attorney Advertising and Solicitation on the Internet: Complying
with Ethics Regulations and Netiquette, 13 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 697, 713 (1995).
200. An e-mail message is generally not sent in one piece but in different packets from server to
server ("packetization"), using "routers to determine which path will take the message to the
intended destination." Leonard, supra note 1, at 855. This raises particular concern regarding the
application of the attorney-client privilege and duty of confidentiality to e-mail communications. See
id, at 853. The application of the attorney-client privilege and the duty of confidentiality to
communications on the Internet are not subjects of this Article.
201. See State Bar of Mich., Op. RI-276 (1996) (visited Apr. 18, 2000) <http://www. Michbar.
org/opinionslethics/numberedopinions/ri-276.htm>. The Michigan Committee noted that e-mail is
"not as private as sending a sealed letter, and there is an expectation, but no guarantee, that the
communication has been received by the intended recipient." Id.
202. See Tennessee Sup. Ct., Bd. of Prof. Resp., Advisory Op. 95-A-570 (1995).
203. See id, It should be noted that Model Rule 7.3 prohibits only live telephone contacts, and
arguably an uninvited e-mail solicitation would more closely resemble a recorded telephone call
rather than a live telephone contact. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.3 (1983). A
proposed Tennessee rule would treat a computer transmission similar to a targeted mailing,
providing as follows at Proposed Rule 7.3 (b) and (c):
.(b) A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment by a writing, recording, telegram,
facsimile, computer transmission or other mode of communication directed to a specifically
identified recipient who has not initiated the contact with the lawyer if
(1) the person solicited has made known to the lawyer a desire not to be contacted by
the lawyer, or
(2) the communication constitutes overreaching, coercion, duress, harassment, undue
influence, intimidation, or fraud; or
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If one views e-mail transmissions in the same light as letters, the
question arises whether such communications more closely resemble a
targeted letter or a general mailing. In making a distinction between the
two, the probable determinative factors would be the nature of the
message's content and whether the communication is responding to a
particular problem of the recipient. By imposing requirements similar to
those for targeted mailings, a new Florida rule treats e-mail messages to
prospective clients as direct-mail communications without making a
distinction as to content or recipient status, thus applying regulations
similar to those required for targeted mailings for all such
communications. 5 A proposed revision to Model Rule 7.3 treats e-mail
(3) a significant motive for the solicitation is the lawyer's pecuniary gain and the
communication concerns an action for personal injury, worker's compensation or
wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the person
to whom the communication is addressed or a member of that person's family,
unless the accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the mailing or
transmission of the communication or the lawyer has a family or prior professional
relationship with the person solicited.
(c) If a significant motive for the solicitation is the lawyer's pecuniary gain, a lawyer shall not
send or dispatch a communication soliciting professional employment from a specifically
identified recipient who has not initiated a contact with the lawyer and with who the lawyer has
no family or prior professional relationship unless the communication complies with the
following requirements:
(1) Each communication, including envelopes and self-mailing brochures or
pamphlets, shall include the words "This is an advertisement" as follows:
(a) in written communications sent by mail, telegraph, facsimile, or computer
transmission, the required wording shall appear in conspicuous print size on
the outside envelope, if any, and at the beginning and end of the written
material ....
Tennessee Bar Ass'n, Comm. for Study of Standards of Prof. Conduct, Final Report, Proposed Rule
7.3 (2000).
204. See Internet, supra note 1, at 81:559. It has been noted that "[a]s Web technology shifts to a
'push'-oriented paradigm in which information is sent to targeted recipients, advertising activity on
the Web may become more intrusive, potentially undercutting the argument that commercial speech
on the Web should be minimally regulated because it must be actively sought out by users." John B.
Kennedy, Legal Advertising and Ethics on the World Wide Web, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 27, 1997, at SI, S9.
However, this "push" technology, which gets a lawyer or firm's name into certain e-mail boxes
"amounts to little more than plain old e-mail." Kevin Lee Thomason, "Interactivity" is a Buzzword
for Web Sites, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 9, 1998, at B9, B12.
205. The new Florida rule, which was approved by the Board of Governors at its meeting in Key
Largo on May 30, 1997, was approved by the Florida Supreme Court on December 17, 1999 and
corrected on December 30, 1999. Florida Rule 4-7.6(c) on Electronic Mail Communications
provides as follows:
A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, on the lawyer's behalf or on behalf of
the lawyer's firm or partner, an associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the
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messages as targeted mailings when they are directed to "a prospective
client known to be in need of legal services in a particular matter."2" 6
More troubling than the use of promotional e-mail by lawyers is
uninvited, interactive communications initiated by lawyers on the
Internet. Unsolicited messages to prospective clients sent during "real
time" conversations in Internet chat groups appear to move closer to in-
person contact or live telephone communications. These exchanges have
been viewed as resembling an actual conversation, except that "the
dialogue is textual rather than oral."2"7 The Committee in Michigan
viewed these uninvited interactive conversations as direct solicitation,
which is outside activity permitted by Model Rule 7.3.208 A similar
position has been taken in the recent proposed changes to Model Rule
7.3.209 However, the Committee in Arizona determined that
lawyer's firm, an unsolicited electronic mail communication directly or indirectly to a
prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment unless:
(1) the requirements of subdivisions (b)(1), (b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(E), (b)(2)(G), (b)(2)(H),
(b)(2)(J), and (b)(2)(K) of rule 4-7A are met;
(2) the communication discloses I or more bona fide office locations of the lawyer or
lawyers who will actually perform the services advertised, in accordance with
subdivision (a)(2) of rule 4-7.2; and
(3) the subject line of the communication states "legal advertisement"
Fla. Rules of Prof. Conduct Rule 4-7.6(c) (1999). A Comment to the rule provides in pertinent part:
The specific regulations that govern computer-accessed communications differ according to the
particular variety of communication employed. For example, a lawyer's Interet web site is
accessed by the viewer upon the viewer's initiative and, accordingly, the standards governing
such communications correspond to the rules applicable to information provided to a
prospective client at the prospective client's request.
In contrast, unsolicited electronic mail messages from lawyers to prospective clients are
functionally comparable to direct mail communications and thus are governed by similar rules.
Additionally, communications advertising or promoting a lawyer's services that are posted on
search engine screens or elsewhere by the lawyer, or at the lawyer's behest, with the hope that
they will be seen by prospective clients are simply a form of lawyer advertising and are treated
as such by the rules.
Fla. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 4-7.6 cmt.
206. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Proposed Rule 7.3 (2000); see also supra note 134.
207. See Internet, supra note 1, at 81:560.
208. See Michigan Ethics Opinion, supra note 191. The Committee distinguished e-mail from
immediate electronic conversations, which it characterized as "real time" communications,
analogous to in-person solicitation. Id.
209. See supra note 154. The proposed revision to Model Rule 7.3 (a) states as follows: "[a]
lawyer shall not by in-person, live telephone or real-time electronic contact solicit professional
employment from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family, close personal or prior
professional relationship when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's
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communicating with a potential client in a chat room should not be
considered a prohibited telephone or in-person contact because the
potential client "has the option of not responding to unwanted
solicitations.2 ° In addition to the fact that the recipient need not respond
in chat-room communications, it should also be noted that unlike in-
person solicitation, online communications are recorded. The fact that a
communication is preserved would arguably decrease the likelihood of
abusive practices historically feared in direct contact of prospective
clients by lawyers.2 1 The Philadelphia Bar Ethics Committee determined
that lawyers generally may communicate in chat rooms with non-clients
about the subject of pending or contemplated litigation 12 However, the
Philadelphia Bar Committee suggested that lawyers exercise caution and
warned that "conversation interactions with persons on the Internet do
not constitute improper solicitation, but in any one particular case the
interaction may evolve in such a way that it could be characterized as
such.,
213
pecuniary gain." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Proposed Rule 7.3(a) (2000). The Reporter's
Explanation of Changes states the following with respect to "real-time electronic contact":
The Commission, in accord with the ABA Commission on Responsibility in Client
Development (formerly the Commission on Advertising), is recommending that lawyer
Solicitation of business by real-time electronic communication (e.g., an Internet chat room) be
prohibited. Differentiating between e-mail and real-time electronic communication, the
Commission has concluded that the interactivity and immediacy of response in real-time
electronic communication presents the same dangers as those involved in live telephone contact.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Proposed Rule 7.3, Reporter's Explanation of Changes. The
reference to the ABA Commission on Responsibility in Client Development, formerly the
Commission on Advertising, relates to the White Paper submitted to Ethics 2000 by the ABA
Commission on Advertising. See generally White Paper, supra note 131.
210. State Bar of Ariz., Comm. on Rules of Prof. Conduct, Formal Op. 97-04, at 3 (Apr. 7, 1997).
The opinion further states, however, that if the lawyer initiates contact and the potential client has a
known legal need for a particular matter, the lawyer must comply with disclosure obligations
associated with targeted mailings. See id. at 4.
211. See Internet, supra note 1, at 81:560.
212. See Philadelphia Bar Ass'n, Prof. Guidance Comm., Op. 98-6 (Mar. 1998).
213. Id. The panel further cautioned lawyers to be mindful of the following: the lawyer "must be
truthful in all comments made"; "may not communicate about the subject of a representation with a
party he knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter"; "may not deal on behalf of a
client with a person who is not represented while the [lawyer] is stating or implying that he or she is
disinterested, or give advice to an unrepresented person whose interests are or have a reasonable
possibility of being adverse to the [lawyer's] client"; "should consider including on any
communication a notice that he is a lawyer licensed in Pennsylvania, and he is not purporting to give
any kind of advice other than in accordance with that status and that he is not purporting to practice
law in any other jurisdiction"; and that an Internet discussion could result in the creation of an
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While chat groups and conference areas raise concerns about
overreaching by lawyers, of still greater concern are evolving forms of
communication using computers, fiber optics, and video cameras.
Attempting to simulate actual contact, the capacity to routinely bring
virtual reality to remote contacts looms in the future." 4 As breakthroughs
in technology continue to emerge, state-of-the-art communications are
likely to be more life-like and ease of access is likely to increase.
Regardless of whether these communications are recorded, their potential
for intrusiveness is significant. It stands to reason that the closer
technology comes to simulating face-to-face exchanges, communications
seeking professional employment lend themselves to being condemned
as impermissible solicitation.
E. Archiving and Labeling Requirements Applied to Electronic
Communications
As technology continues to evolve, states are finding that rules crafted
within the context of print and broadcast media raise repeated obstacles
that appear to be gaining in significance. One problem lawyers are facing
is the implementation of archiving and labeling requirements to
electronic communications. The Model Rules archiving requirement that
advertising materials be retained for two years, along with a record of
when and where they are used,2"5 presents practical problems for a
lawyer with a home page. Similarly problematic for lawyers on the Web
are requirements relating to targeted mailings, for which envelopes and
recorded communications must be labeled "Advertising Material."2 6
Jurisdictions have taken different positions on whether filing and
retention requirements are applicable to information posted on the
Internet.217 Because communications on the Internet present a cost-
effective way to convey current information,2"8 it is in the interest of the
public, as well as the purveyor of the information, to keep posted
attorney-client relationship, "with all that such a relationship implies including creation of potential
conflicts of interest (see Rules 1.7 & 1.9) and expectations of confidentiality (see Rule 1.6)." Id.
214. See Gilpin, supra note 199, at 724-25.
215. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.2(b) (1983) (amended 1990); supra note
113 and accompanying text.
216. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Model Rule 7.3(c) (1983) (amended 1989); supra note
112 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 193, 195-96 and accompanying text.
218. See Hankins, supra note 16.
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material timely. While proposed changes to the Model Rules allow for
archiving by "electronic record,"219  the Model Rules retention
requirements may place an onerous burden on lawyers who vigilantly
update and supplement information on their Web sites. Thus, archiving
requirements can discourage a lawyer from revising a site with current
material on a routine basis, working to the disadvantage of all involved.
Furthermore, applying archiving requirements to cyberspace leaves the
lawyer with significant questions. For instance, what type of record of
electronic communications must be retained? What changes to a site
must be documented? If a jurisdiction requires that certain material be
screened, filed, or subject to a filing fee, does an update to a Web site
trigger subsequent screening, filing, or fee responsibilities?
In addition to retention and record-keeping requirements, the Model
Rules require that targeted solicitations be labeled "Advertising
Material." Written within the context of print and broadcast media, these
words must appear "on the outside envelope and at the beginning and
ending of any recorded communication."2 The proposed changes to the
Model Rules would change this to read "on the outside envelope, if any,
and at the beginning and ending of any recorded or electronic
communication."22' If e-mail is considered a targeted solicitation, then
these labeling requirements are applicable. Lawyers using the Internet
are faced with significant questions related to compliance. For instance,
if it is determined that electronic communications should be labeled, then
how should this requirement manifest? Furthermore, if electronic
communications must be labeled, does this same requirement apply to
linked material?
In an attempt to address the issue of Internet advertising, the Texas
State Bar Association's Advertising Review Committee issued guidelines
219. The proposed change to Model Rule 7.2(b) provides as follows: "[a] copy, recording or
electronic record of an advertisement or communication shall be kept for two years after its last
dissemination along with a record of when and where it was used." Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Proposed Rule 7.2(b) (2000) (strikethroughs omitted).
220. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.3(c), supra note 112 and accompanying text.
221. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.3(c). The proposed changes to Model Rule
7.3(c) would require that targeted electronic communications be labeled "Advertising Material":
Every written, recorded or electronic communication from a lawyer soliciting professional
employment from a prospective client known to be in need of legal services in a particular
manner, and with whom the lawyer has no family, close personal or prior professional
relationship, shall include the words "Advertising Material" on the outside envelope, if any, and
at the beginning and ending of any recorded or electronic communication.
Id.
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that appeared as interpretive comments to the Texas Disciplinary Rules
of Professional Conduct.' Under these guidelines, Texas lawyers with a
home page must submit a hard copy of the first screen shown when their
ULR address' is accessed, along with a fee of $50, to the Advertising
Review Committee. 24 Information linked to the first screen of a Texas
lawyer's home page need not be submitted, however, unless it primarily
concerns the solicitation of prospective clients. 5 A proposed Texas rule,
which was voted down on a procedural challenge, retained its labeling
requirement for written solicitations to be marked
"ADVERTISEMENT," specifically making it applicable to both non-
electronically transmitted communications and e-mail messages.226 With
the exception of Web sites and home pages, Florida's new rules on
222. See Kennedy, supra note 204; see also How Do Advertising Rules Apply to Lawyers on the
Net?, 12 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA), at 39 (Feb. 21, 1996).
223. See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
224. Subsection (c) of Proposed Texas Rule 7.07, Filing Requirements for Public Advertisements
and Written, Recorded, or Other Electronic Solicitations, voted down on a procedural challenge,
provided as follows:
Except as provided in Paragraph (e) of this Rule, a lawyer shall file with the Advertising
Review Committee of the State Bar of Texas no later than its first posting on the Internet or
other comparable network of computers information concerning the lawyer's or lawyer's firm's
Website. As used in this Rule, a "Website" is a publication on the Internet or other network of
computers, consisting of a file, a part of a file, or a collection of files, that is accessible to the
general public. The filing shall include:
(1) each unit of the Website up to a maximum of ten of those units that, standing
alone, would not be exempt from filing under paragraph (e). As used in this
subparagraph (1), a "unit" of a Website is the equivalent of one 8-1/2" x 11"
printed page of text or one minute of audio or audio-visual production script;
(2) a completed lawyer advertising and solicitation application form; and
(3) a check or money order payable to the State Bar of Texas for the fee set by the
Board of Directors. Such fee shall be set for the sole purpose of defraying the
expense of enforcing the rules related to such Websites. In addition, the fee set
shall permit the filing party to submit any modifications made to the units of its
Website filed pursuant to subparagraph (c)(l) within one year of their initial
approval or pre-approval, for review by the Advertising Review Committee at no
additional charge.
Tex Disciplinary Rules of Prof Conduct Proposed Rule 7.07(c) (1998). Subsection (e) of Proposed
Rule 7.07 listed exclusions for the filing requirements, including "links to other Websites" and
"other publicly available information concerning legal issues, not prepared or paid for by the firm or
any of its lawyers, such as news articles, legal articles, editorial opinions, or other legal
developments or events, such as proposed or enacted rules, regulations, or legislation." Tex.
Disciplinary Rules of Prof Conduct Proposed Rule 7.07(e)(1)(x), (xi) (1998).
225. See State Bar of Tex., Advertising Review Packet cmt.17 (1998).
226. Proposed Texas Rule 7.05(b) provided as follows:
Washington Law Review Vol. 75:785, 2000
advertising require that a lawyer file a statement describing when and
where the advertisement will appear, as well a $100 filing fee for "all
computer-accessed communications concerning a lawyer's or law firm's
service., 227 Proposed Tennessee Rule 7.2 specifically includes "World
Wide Web site" in the list of approved media for lawyer advertising, 228
and has a filing requirement for advertisements 29 that mandates a
subsequent filing for communications "changed in any material
respect.,
23 °
While attempting to resolve issues by regulating unique features of
media, state rules applying to Web sites should not create more questions
Except as provided in paragraph (f) of this Rule, a written solicitation communication to
prospective clients for the purpose of obtaining professional employment:
(1) shall, in the case of a non-electronically transmitted written communication, be
plainly marked "ADVERTISEMENT" on its first page and on the face of the
envelope or other packaging used to transmit the communication. If the written
communication is in the form of a self-mailing brochure or pamphlet, the word
"ADVERTISEMENT' shall be:
(i) in a color that contrasts sharply with the background color, and
(ii) in a size of at least 3/8" vertically or three times the vertical height of the
letters used in the body of such communication, whichever is larger,
(2) shall, in the case of an electronic mail message, be plainly marked
"ADVERTISEMENT" in the "subject" portion of the standard electronic mail
format and at the beginning of the message's text ....
Tex. Disciplinary Rules of Prof Conduct Proposed Rule 7.05(b) (1998).
227. Fla. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 4-7.6 (1999).
228. Tennessee Bar Ass'n, Comm. for Study of Prof. Conduct, Final Report, Proposed Rule 7.2(a)
(2000).
229. Tennessee Bar Ass'n, Comm. for Study of Prof. Conduct, Final Report, Proposed Rule
7.2(b). Proposed Rule 7.2(b) provides as follows:
Within three days after the publication, distribution, or dispatch of an advertisement or a
communication not directed to a specifically identified recipient, the lawyer shall file a copy of
the advertisement or communication with the Board of Professional Responsibility, provided,
however, that such filing is not required for any communication that only includes the name,
address and profession of the lawyer or has been exempted from the filing requirement by the
Board of Professional Responsibility.
(I) If communications which are similar in all material respects are published or
displayed more than once or distributed to more than one person, the lawyer may
comply with this requirement by filing a single copy of the communication.
(2) If a communication which has previously been filed with the Board is changed in
any material respect, a notice of the changes shall be filed with the Board within
three days after its publication, distribution, or dispatch.
Id.
230. Id.
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for lawyers than they answer. For example, in addressing the matter of
fee applicability, the proposed Texas rules had stated that a required
filing fee entitles the filing party to submit modifications to a Web site
for review within one year at no additional charge."' While the rule
attempted to resolve the fee issue, it did not explain which modifications
to a Web site triggered the requirement of submission. If a site is updated
on a weekly basis, the administrative burden of multiple submissions
could be significant. Also, the proposed Tennessee rule limits subsequent
filings to instances where there is a "material" change. 2 However, since
"material" sets a subjective standard, it is unclear when subsequent
filings are mandated.
Jurisdictions specifically addressing current electronic communica-
tion issues must be mindful that as technology continues to evolve, rules
crafted today may not address emerging technological capabilities or
issues. For instance, the proposed Texas rule specifically addressed non-
electronically transmitted written communications, as well as e-mail
messages. In the case of the latter, the proposed rule stated that
"ADVERTISEMENT"' shall be "plainly marked" in the "'subject'
portion of the standard electronic mail format and at the beginning of the
message's text." 3 Tailoring the rule to regulate a currently implemented
231. See Tex. Disciplinary Rules of Prof Conduct Proposed Rule 7.07(c)(3) (1998).
232. See supra note 229.
233. Tex. Disciplinary Rules of Prof Conduct Proposed Rule 7.05(bX2). The proposed Texas rule
provided as follows:
Except as provided in paragraph (f) of this Rule, a written solicitation communication to
prospective clients for the purpose of obtaining professional employment
(1) shall, in the case of a non-electronically transmitted written communication, be
plainly marked "ADVERTISEMENT" on its first page, and on the face of the
envelope or other packaging used to transmit the communication. If the written
communication is in the form of a self-mailing brochure or pamphlet, the word
"ADVERTISEMENT" shall be:
(i) in a color that contrasts sharply with the background color, and
(ii) in a size of at least 3/8" vertically or three times the vertical height of the
letters used in the body of such communication, whichever is larger,
(2) shall, in the case of an electronic mail message, be plainly marked
"ADVERTISEMENT" in the "subject" portion of the standard electronic mail
format and at the beginning of the message's text;
(3) shall not be made to resemble legal pleadings or other legal documents.
Tex Disciplinary Rules of Prof Conduct Proposed Rule 7.05(b)(1)-(b)(3) (1998). Similarly, the
new Florida Rule requires that in an e-mail communication, "the subject line of the communication
states 'legal advertisement.'" Fla. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 4-7.6(c)(3) (1999).
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mode of communication is helpful today, but the rule should be more
broadly crafted so the standard can be applied in other contexts as
technological advances emerge. For example, in addition to referencing
e-mail specifically, states could provide general mandates for electronic
communications. As state committees, bar associations, and national
commissions focus on issues related to emerging technologies, they must
be mindful that technological innovations will out-pace mandated
regulatory schemes. Any approach taken to formulating guidelines in this
regard must be flexible and open to broad interpretation. If care is not
taken, it is likely that rules will be outdated even prior to their
implementation.
IV. SPECIFIC COMPONENTS OF THE INTERNET AND THE
EFFICACY OF THEIR USE
Lawyers communicating on the Internet necessarily transmit
information across state lines. While jurisdictions have disparate rules
relating to advertising and solicitation, every jurisdiction prohibits
lawyers from making communications that are false or misleading." 4
Although this mandate may sound straightforward, it is not: within the
confines of broadcast and print media, courts235 and state ethics
234. See Hill, supra note 41, at 91; Krakaur, supra note 133, at 2. Model Rule 7.1 prohibits
misleading communications. See supra note 97. The proposed changes to Model Rule 7.1 would
amend the rule to state simply: "A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about
the lawyer or the lawyer's services." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Proposed Rule 7.1
(2000). The proposed revision would relocate the remainder of current Model Rule 7.1 to the
comments "as examples of statements that may be false or misleading." Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Reporter's Explanation of Changes. It is noted that in making this change, "[t]he
Commission concurred with the concern of the ABA Commission on Responsibility in Client
Development (formerly the Commission on Advertising) that the specific prohibitions in paragraphs
(b) and (c) are overbroad and may unduly deter the communication of truthful information." Id. This
notation reflects positions taken in the white Paper submitted to Ethics 2000 by the ABA
Commission on Advertising. See White Paper, supra note 131, at 32-33.
235. In reviewing challenged restrictions on speech, courts have found various types of statements
in lawyer advertising to be misleading. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471
U.S. 626, 652 (1985) (holding that advertising stating that no fee will be charged is misleading,
unless advertisement also states that client will remain liable for costs and expenses of litigation, if
such costs inure to client); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 205 (1982) (noting that advertisement stating
that lawyer was "Admitted to Practice before: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT" could
be misleading to public unfamiliar with admission requirements); Spencer v. Honorable Justices of
Pa. Sup. Ct., 579 F. Supp. 880, 887-88 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (holding it appropriate to ban use of
subjective and difficult-to-verify terms, such as "experienced," "expert," "highly qualified," and
"competent"), aff'd, 760 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1985); In re Zang, 741 P.2d 267, 276 (Ariz. 1987)
(determining that law firm's advertisements referring to skill associated with aspects of personal-
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committees 6 differ on what constitutes a false or misleading
communication. This situation is further complicated by the intricacies of
injury litigation were false and misleading when no lawyer in firm had tried personal injury case to
conclusion and firm typically referred actions culminating in litigation to other lawyers); People v.
Carpenter, 893 P.2d 777, 777 (Colo. 1995) (implying that lawyer referral service supplying many
lawyers in 13 fields was misleading, when in fact there were no more than five lawyers available in
four fields); People v. Roehl, 655 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Colo. 1983) (determining that advertisements for
routine legal services at fixed fee that did not disclose hidden costs were misleading); State v.
Russell, 610 P.2d 1122, 1128 (Kan. 1980) (holding that intentionally publishing known falsehoods
in attempt to gain personal advantage constitutes misrepresentation); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v.
Gangwish, 618 S.W.2d 176, 176 (Ky. 1981) (holding that advertising under fictitious corporate
name was misleading); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. McCloskey, 511 A.2d 56, 59 (Md. 1986)
(holding that national advertisement offering "quickie divorce" was misleading because it created
unjustified expectations); State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Michaelis, 316 N.W.2d 46, 55
(Neb. 1982) (determining that publishing criticism containing unfounded statements regarding
opposing candidates in political campaign was misleading); In re Donnelly, 470 N.W.2d 305, 305
(Vis. 1991) (holding that advertising for Dominican Republic divorces was misleading, absent
disclaimer of their questionable validity in given state); see also Eaton v. Supreme Ct., 607 S.W.2d
55, 59 (Ark. 1980) (holding that advertisement including "[o]ther legal problems?" and "there is no
time or subject limitation" was misleading; could indicate to public that lawyer was competent to
consult and advise on any legal question).
What has been judged to be misleading in one jurisdiction may not be misleading in another. In
examining restrictions on lawyers' commercial speech, courts have also indicated types of
statements which are not considered misleading. See, e.g., Capoccia v. Committee on Prof.
Standards, 59 U.S.L.W. 2445, 2445 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (determining that advertising that lawyer is
"smart, tough lawyer" who can obtain "fast, fair cash compensation" for automobile-accident victims
not false and misleading in light of no-fault laws of jurisdiction); Lyon v. Alabama State Bar, 451
So. 2d 1367, 1372 (Ala. 1984) (holding that advertisement stating that "above fees do not include
court costs" not misleading since it was sufficient to inform public to inquire about matter of court
costs); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Ficker, 572 A.2d 501, 507 (Md. 1990) (holding that
advertisement seeking clients for "palimony" cases, while crass and in bad taste, was not false and
misleading despite ambiguity of words and notwithstanding fact that jurisdiction did not recognize
all types of palimony claims).
236. When inquiring into whether a particular assertion by a lawyer is misleading, state ethics
committees, either in a binding or an advisory fashion, have condemned certain practices. See, e.g.,
Connecticut Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. 88-3, [1998 Transfer Vol.] Nat'l Rep. Legal
Ethics (Univ. Pub. Am.) CT: opinions 36 (1988) (determining that advertisement employing
fabricated newspaper article with headline "Biker Awarded $250,000 for Accident" was misleading;
article not written by independent source but created for advertising purposes); District of Columbia
Bar Ass'n, Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 235 (1993) (noting as possibly misleading law firm registered
in another state as "limited liability partnership" or "limited liability company" using phrase
"L.L.P." or "L.L.C. ' in advertising, because citizens may be unfamiliar with terms); Maryland State
Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Ethics, Op. 91-16 (1991) (determining that using testimonials in which clients
or actors describe services performed by lawyer was misleading because it could create unjustified
expectations of potential clients); Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof. Resp.,
Op. 85-170, [1986 Transfer Vol.] Nat'l Rep. Legal Ethics (Univ. Pub. Am.) PA: opinions 8 (1985)
(opining that use of subjective terms such as "expert" or "competent" impermissible because such
terms are inherently misleading); Philadelphia Bar Ass'n, Prof. Guidance Comm., Op. 95-12 (1995)
(determining that advertising "25 Years of Legal Representation" and "30 Years Legal
Representation" was contradictory and misleading because advertisement fails to explain to whom
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cyberspace,23 7 where ever-evolving technological advances may be
evaluated from the perspective of disparate rules, most of which were
drafted before widespread Internet use.
Characteristics of modem technology, such as domain names,238
links,239  meta tags,24  invisible ink,24  and the like, present new,
problematic practices and issues. In fact, it is possible that the mere use
of some technological aspects of cyberspace may in and of itself
constitute misleading communications in certain jurisdictions.
A. Domain Names as Communications that May Be Misleading
For the Internet to function properly, each Internet computer must
have a unique Internet Protocol (IP) address, so that messages can reach
the proper place.242 This IP address is combined with an alphabetical
experience belonged and in what field experience was gained); Philadelphia Bar Ass'n, Prof.
Guidance Comm., Op. 87-27 (1987) (deciding that using as reference "business lawyer" and
claiming that one's "business plan" is "unique," "revolutionary," and gives "audit protection" may
be misleading and create unjustified expectations); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Prof. Ethics,
Op. 539 (1982) (determining that lawyer describing selected past cases with recovery amounts in
advertisement was misleading because it was difficult to verify, suggested lawyer can achieve
similar results in other cases and gave appearance that lawyer has significant stature in given area).
As with court decisions, ethics committees from the various states have also differed on what
constitutes a misleading communication. See, e.g., Connecticut Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Prof. Ethics,
Informal Op. 88-6, [1998 Transfer Vol.] Nat'l Rep. Legal Ethics (Univ. Pub. Am.) CT: opinions 36
(1988) (opining that Yellow Pages advertisement stating that "We Will Investigate and Push Your
Claims" was not misleading; neither promised that client would win nor created unjustified
expectations about lawyer); District of Columbia Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 188 (1987)
(finding statement that "thousands of successful claims" had been brought against particular
manufacturer not misleading; statement neither led people to believe that individuals recovered
amount of their claim nor reflected any individual lawyer's rate of success); Nassau County (N.Y.)
Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. 6-87 (1987) (determining lawyer advertisement that
corporations could be formed for "$65 plus disbursements" not misleading, despite later informing
inquiring client that disbursements usually cost about $230).
237. Modem technology has provided "a unique medium-known as cyberspace-located in no
particular location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Interet." Reno
v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 852 (1997).
238. See infra notes 245-56 and accompanying text.
239. See infra notes 257-75 and accompanying text.
240. See infra notes 286-90 and accompanying text.
241. See infra notes 291-94 and accompanying text.
242. See David G. Post, Plugging In, Am. Law., Sept. 1997. The Internet, created in the 1960s,
was initially used primarily for research. It was managed by the Department of Defense's Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) until the early 1980s, when the Domain Name System (DNS)
was developed to translate Internet names into IP numbers for transmission across networks. See
Lawyer Communications on the Internet
name in a database243 that can be accessed by the many Internet Service
Providers.2' Domain names are components of IP addresses, or Uniform
Resource Locations (URL),245 that have been compared to an individual
or entity's telephone number.246 Although there is authority that domain
names cannot constitute law firm names,247 the comment to Proposed
Model Rule 7.5 states that "[a] lawyer or law firm may also be
designated by a distinctive website address or comparable professional
designation.""24 Arguably, domain names can also be compared to a type
of a trade name.249
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, White Paper, Management of Interet Names and Addresses [hereinafter
Dep 't of Com. White Paper].
243. Historically, the National Science Foundation (NSF) has maintained a database matching
numerical IPs with alphabetical names, which is sent to a designated root server. See Dep't of Com.
White Paper, supra note 242. The root-server system is comprised of 13 file servers that collec-
tively contain all Top Level Domain Names (TLDs). Routing requires universal name consistency.
See id.
244. See Post, supra note 242.
245. A URL is a Web site address usually made up, in part, of top level and secondary domain
names. See infra note 252.
246. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 852 (1997); Post, supra note 242. Unlike telephone
numbers, however, domain names are not limited by a defined number of characters. See id.
247. See supra note 186; State Bar of Ariz., Comm. on Rules of Prof. Conduct, Formal Op. 97-04,
at 3 (Apr. 7, 1997). The State Bar of Arizona Committee on the Rules of Professional Conduct was
asked the following question: "Can a 'website' use a trade name as the law firm name?" The
Committee's response was negative, since the Arizona rule prohibits the use of trade names for law
firms. Id. The opinion went on to state that "(d)omain names, however, are not firm names and thus
are not subject to this limitation." Id. The Supreme Court of Ohio Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline has also determined that domain names are not subject to regulation as
firm names since domain names actually represent site addresses. See Ohio Sup. Ct., Bd. of
Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 99-4 (June 4, 1999). However, the Board determined
that domain names are subject to rules that prohibit false or misleading communications and that
restrict specialization claims. See id
248. Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct Proposed Rule 7.5 cmt.1 (2000).
249. See, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.5 (1983). That rule addresses
professional designations and trade names and provides as follows:
Firm Names and Designations
(a) A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or other professional designation that violates
Rule 7.1. A trade name may be used by a lawyer in private practice if it does not imply a
connection with a government agency or with a public or charitable legal services organization
and is not otherwise in violation of Rule 7. 1.
(b) A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same name in each
jurisdiction, but identification of the lawyers in an office of the firm shall indicate the
jurisdictional limitations on those not licensed to practice in the jurisdiction where the office is
located.
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A portion of a domain name, as well as an e-mail address, 25° is usually
selected by the user and then registered25" ' to become that entity or
person's Internet address or identifier.252 The selection of a domain name
or e-mail address is similar to the selection of a vanity-type telephone
number, such as "I-800-LAWYERS," or, some may argue, a trade name,
such as "Women's Law Forum., 253 However, should a lawyer select a
domain name or e-mail address that contains language a jurisdiction has
judged to be misleading, this may constitute a communication or
professional designation that is considered deceptive. For instance, in
Pennsylvania, the use of subjective terms such as "expert" or
"competent" have been found to be inherently misleading. 4 Arguably, a
(c) The name of a lawyer holding a public office shall not be used in the name of a law firm, or
in communications on its behalf, during any substantial period in which the lawyer is not
actively and regularly practicing with the firm.
(d) Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only
when that is the fact.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.5. The Model Code precluded the use of trade names
by lawyers, a practice condoned in the Model Rules. Compare Model Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 2-102(B) (1969), with Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.5.
250. See supra note 6.
25 1. Until September 30, 1998, the registration and propagation of domain names was performed
by Network Solutions, Inc., under a five-year cooperative agreement with the NSF. See Dep 't of
Com. White Paper, supra note 242. The Department of Commerce has designated the newly formed
Interet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to administer and maintain the
DNS. See David G. Post, The Domain Name System and Internet Governance, (on file with author).
In April, 1999, ICANN launched a pilot program "allowing five new firms to compete with NSI as
domain name registrars." New Net Authority Faults NSI Intransigence; Commerce Sees Bad
Behavior on Both Sides, 68 U.S.L.W., July 20, 1999, at 2046.
252. Domain names contain a number of components. One component is the generic Top-Level
Domain (gTLD) that applies to the type of user and appears at the right end of the domain name.
Over 200 country-wide gTLDs are administered by governments and private entities, such as ".jp"
for Japan and ".fir" for France. Some gTLDs denote an intended function, such as ".com" for
commercial uses, ".edu" for educational entities, and ".gov" for non-military governmental sites. See
Dep't of Com. White Paper, supra note 242. Another domain name component is the second level
domain (SLD) that appears to the left of the gTLD. The SLD name is generally selected and
registered by the user, subject to limitations such as previously assigned names and trademark
infringement. See id. These domain names are usually combined with "www" and "http" for World
Wide Web and hypertext transfer protocol, respectively, to form a ULR which is a Web site address.
See id. The SLD and gTLD names usually become part of an individual or entity's e-mail address,
which is formulated by preceding the SLD and gTLD name with a selected notation for a specific
individual or entity, and the symbol "@." See White Paper, supra note 131, at 15-16.
253. But see supra notes 247-249 and accompanying text.
254. See Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof. Resp., Op. 85-170, [1986
Transfer Vol.] 5 Nat'l Rep. Legal Ethics (Univ. Pub. Am.) PA: opinions 8 (1985); see also id at Op.
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Pennsylvania lawyer choosing a domain name encompassing these terms
would be subject to discipline under Model Rule 7.1 since this rule
applies to all communications about the lawyer or the lawyer's services,
not just commercial speech." Furthermore, Model Rule 7.5, which
relates to firm names and designations, prohibits the use of "a firm
name, letterhead or other professional designation that violates Rule
7. 1.11256
Take the hypothetical situation of a lawyer or law firm having a
domain name or e-mail address that contains the language
"excellent.competent.lawyer." If the lawyer is licensed to practice in a
jurisdiction which condemns this language as misleading, the lawyer
may be subject to discipline for incorporating "excellent" and
"competent" into a domain name or e-mail address. If, conversely, the
jurisdiction in which the hypothetical lawyer is licensed to practice finds
this language permissible, its use as a selected reference may be perfectly
appropriate.
B. A Lawyer's Responsibility for Material Linked to the Lawyer's Site
In addition to domain names or e-mail addresses, emerging
technologies and cyberspace issues present multiple concerns relating to
lawyer communications. One of these concerns relates to links, or
hyperlinks, which are text or symbols that can be accessed on a site in
order to switch to an identified item. 7 A Web site can be accessed
directly through its URL, or through a link from any other linking site. 8
Just as a site can be accessed by a link, it can also link to other sites. 9 If
a lawyer or law firm's Web site must comply with the applicable state
ethics rules, is the lawyer also responsible for the efficacy of material on
93-183B (1993); Philadelphia Bar Ass'n, Prof. Guidance Comm., Op. 87-27, [1989 Transfer Vol.] 4
Nat'l Rep. Legal Ethics (Univ. Pub. Am.) PA: opinions 46 (1987).
255. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 97. In stating that a Web site address is a law-firm designation in the
comment to Proposed Model Rule 7.5, it follows that "a law firm may not use a website address that
violates Rule 7.1 " Model Rules of Professional Conduct Proposed Rule 7.5 (2000).
257. Hyperlinks, or links, are "hidden code in a Web page that enables a user to leave that page
and travel to another by merely clicking a mouse." Hankins, supra note 16.
258. See White Paper, supra note 131, at 16.
259. See id.
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the site from which, or to which, the Web site of the lawyer is linked?2"
If a lawyer is responsible for linked material, must linked material be
archived, or perhaps labeled, in accordance with the Model Rule
mandates?26
The comments to the new Florida rules specifically state that the rules
related to computer-accessed communications do not apply simply
because someone links material to a lawyer's site.262 What is not
addressed, however, is whether the proposed rules apply when it is the
lawyer who links material with his or her own site. It stands to reason
that if lawyers are not responsible for material to which they link,
"lawyers would be able to provide their potential clients with
information, through the links, that would be impermissible for them to
do directly." '263
It is somewhat problematic to approach the issue of hypertext links
from a traditional commercial-speech analysis. The regulations on
advertising and solicitation that impose restrictions on commercial
speech are limited to speech of that kind.2" It follows that linked material
must be deemed commercial speech if a lawyer is to be responsible for
linked material's compliance with the rules on advertising and
solicitation. Using a content-based approach, most linked material would
probably be considered noncommercial, since the proposition of a
transaction is not its underlying purpose.2 65 The question then becomes
whether the act of the linking should itself trigger the applicability of
these obligations which restrict a lawyer's speech. If the mere act of
linking triggers this responsibility, then the traditional basis upon which
the commercial speech doctrine is based will be negated.26
260. It has been suggested that to make lawyers responsible for the content of links would be an
"enormous" burden. However, if lawyers are not responsible for the content of links, "a convenient
loophole by which they could avoid the rules" would be created. Id. at 35.
261. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
262. The comment to new Florida Rule 4-7.6 provides that "[t]his rule is not triggered merely
because someone other than the lawyer gratuitously links to, or comments on, a lawyer's Internet
web site." Fla. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule 4-7.6 cmt. (1999).
263. See White Paper, supra note 13 1, at 35.
264. See supra note 167.
265. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. A related question to the commercial-speech
issue is whether the commercial and noncommercial aspects of the speech would be intertwined and
if so, are they "inextricably intertwined"? See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
266. The Ethics Committee of Nassau County, New York has favorably reviewed an advertising
service plan which sells hyperlinks to an advertising lawyer's Web site, so long as the viewer does
not communicate directly with the lawyer in a "real-time" dialogue. See Nassau County (N.Y.) Bar
840
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It has been suggested that with links to Web pages, the archiving and
labeling requirements of the Model Rules should apply only when the
linked material is under the control of the lawyer.267 An alternative test
for Model Rule applicability is "whether the linked material is primarily
concerned with obtaining clients." 68 The proposed Texas rules had
specifically addressed this situation in terms of archiving by eliminating
filing requirements "in the case of a Website" and "links to other
Websites."'69 However, the proposed Texas rule required that the linked
information not be false or misleading.7 Arguably, this requirement
makes the lawyer responsible for the content of linked material by
implication, since the rule imposes a requirement related to the accuracy
of the linked material.2"' If a lawyer is responsible for the content of
Ass'n, Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. 99-3 (1999). An Ohio ethics committee has determined that a
lawyer may be listed in an on-line membership directory of a professional association provided the
information contained in law lists and law directories conforms to the advertising rules. See Ohio
Sup. Ct., Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 99-3 (June 4, 1999). The lawyers being
listed may have a link to their e-mail addresses or law firm Web sites. See id. This would not
constitute a referral triggering application of DR 2-103 unless compensation is being provided for
the referral or the directory is being used as part of a lawyer referral service that screens inquiries
and provides referrals. See id. An Arizona Committee deemed on-line service that attempts to match
clients with lawyers a "lawyer referral service" subject to Rule 7.1 when the service performs a
screening function and there is a direct relationship between the fee paid by the participating lawyer
and the number of questions referred to the lawyer. See State Bar of Ariz., Comm. on Rules of Prof.
Conduct, Formal Op. 99-06 (June 9, 1999).
267. See Internet, supra note 1, at 81:555. "Arguably, any other material need not be archived
because the lawyer is not 'responsible for its content' under Rule 7.2(d)." Id. However, if a lawyer is
not responsible for the content of linked material, would linking to this information subject the
lawyer to claims of misrepresentation?
268. Id.
269. Tem Disciplinary Rules of Prof Conduct Proposed Rule 7.07(e)(l)(xi) (1998).
270. Tex. Disciplinary Rules ofProf Conduct Proposed Rule 7.07(e)(1).
271. Proposed Texas Rule 7.07(e) stated as follows:
The filing requirements of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) do not extend to any of the following
materials:
(1) an advertisement in the public media (including a Website) that contains only part or all of
the following information, provided the information is not false or misleading:
(x) in the case of a Website, other publicly available information concerning legal
issues, not prepared or paid for by the firm or any of its lawyers, such as news
articles, legal articles, editorial opinions, or other legal developments or events,
such as proposed or enacted rules, regulations or legislation;
(xi) in the case of a Website, links to other Websites ....
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links, given the ease with which material can be changed, must a lawyer
monitor all linked material for continued compliance with the rules? If a
lawyer is responsible for the compliance of linked material, is the lawyer
also responsible for the compliance of links to a link?
A burden on the lawyer to monitor linked material would pose an
onerous obligation. From a practical standpoint, imposing this burden on
lawyers eliminates their ability to link with other sites. Since links are
"an integral feature of the web component of the World Wide Web, ' '272
arguably a regulation which has the effect of precluding lawyers from
engaging in linking would serve to suppress information to the
consumer, rather than protecting the public from misleading practices.
Some lawyers are avoiding linking because they feel that "all it does is
make it easy for users to leave a site., 273 Instead, they are "mirroring"
content onto their own site by getting permission to copy material, or if
they link, "using 'frames' so that a user clicking on an off-site link never
actually leaves., 274 The prevalent practice in this regard, however, seems
to be for lawyers to include disclaimers "of any endorsement,
responsibility or control on the law firm's part regarding any
information" which might be found at the linking site.275
C. Efficacy of Mechanisms for Priority Search Placement
In addition to accessing a Web site through its URL or through a
linking site, there are search engines that can identify sites mechanically
by the words that appear in a site's HTML language (for example, meta
tags, repetitive phrases, and invisible ink).276 Search engines are designed
to identify sources that contain certain key words, and depending on the
words or phrase used in the search, thousands of matches to HTML
language may be found.277 Typically, a consumer conducting a search
will view results on a screen that will show approximately ten matches at
Tex. Disciplinary Rules of Prof Conduct Proposed Rule 7.07(e)(1)(x), (xi) (1998). Unless the rule
meant that only misleading linked material must comply with the filing requirement, which is
unlikely, a lawyer may not link to a site that contains false or misleading information.
272. White Paper, supra note 131, at 34.
273. Thomason, supra note 204.
274. Id. When using a frame, the linked site appears in a window at the lawyer's site. See id.
275. Kennedy, supra note 204.
276. See White Paper, supra note 131, at 32.
277. Seeid. at31.
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a time.2 As with yellow-page advertising, sources that appear at or near
the beginning of a search are widely considered to have a competitive
advantage.279 A user, however, can increase the chance of a priority
search placement by implementing mechanisms such as repetitive
phrases, meta tags, or invisible ink.2"' The appropriateness of using
practices that result in priority placement may be questionable, as might
the character of the language selected in hopes of "snagging" a search.
Since search engines identify sites by looking for key words in HTML
language, "if a lawyer's home page has repetitive words or phrases that
correspond to those words or phrases used by the consumer to do the
search, the web site will appear at or near the top of the resulting
search. 2 1' The words can be part of the site itself, noted throughout the
text, or sometimes listed at the end of the site as a block.28 2 It stands to
reason that the content of a repetitive phrase must comply with the
applicable jurisdictional mandates. If a lawyer is precluded from using
the term "competent" or "excellent," then its inclusion in a site is
obviously improper. The more pressing issue, however, is whether the
act of using repetitive words or phrases is an appropriate practice. In
essence, is the implementation of a technologically available priority
placement device misleading or inappropriate? Does the use of repetitive
phrases merely serve to confuse the consumer, or is it helpful to the
consumer seeking information?
A Nassau County, New York, ethics committee recently approved a
cyberspace advertising plan where lawyers pay to be listed as "sponsors"
in banner advertisements on Internet sites which provide information
about various areas of the law.283 However, the committee condemned as
misleading a practice that would allow lawyers, for an increased fee, a
priority placement at the head of such an alphabetical list and an
identification as "lead counsel. ''2 ' Viewing priority placement as an
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. See id at 32-34.
281. Id. at 32.
282. See id.
283. See Nassau County (N.Y.) Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. 99-3 (1999). The panel
advised that to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding a disclaimer should be used indicating that
the service is not an attorney-referral service, that it does not recommend the use of any attorney
services, and that the "sponsor" attorney did not prepare legal information provided on the Internet
site. Id
284. Id.
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available technological tool in one's dissemination of information, it
does not appear that the practice of implementing priority placement
should be subject to condemnation, although possible disclosures may be
necessary. Arguably, the problem facing the Nassau County ethics
committee was more the "lead counsel" designation, rather than an
entity's placement out of alphabetical order. The committee noted that
viewers could get the impression that those attorneys noted "are
exceptional compared to other attorneys and are recommended as leading
counsel. ' 85
With a goal of getting information to the public, lawyers should be
permitted to implement a priority-placement device using repetitive
words or phrases, provided the content is neither deceptive nor
misleading. While perhaps giving a lawyer a competitive advantage by
virtue of where information appears in a recipient's search, an individual
still merely accesses readily apparent information that he or she can
choose to use or ignore. Repetitive phrases can be viewed as mere tools
that expand the effectiveness of Internet advertising.
In addition to the use of repetitive phrases, words can also be
embedded in HTML language, thereby triggering a search through the
use of meta tags and invisible ink.286 Meta tags are words that are
embedded in the documents and are not visible when viewing the home
page of an entity.287 While one visiting a site can take extra steps to call
up the HTML language and view any meta tags through the site's source
code,288 their hidden nature may call into question whether the use of
meta tags, in and of itself, constitutes a prohibited practice.
Although visibly hidden on a site, meta tags function as a device to
give material priority placement during the conduct of a search.289 While
priority placement may be considered a deceptive practice or an unfair
advantage by some, it seems that as with repetitive phrases, meta tags
should be judged on the basis of their content, rather than condemned by
the mere fact of their use.290 If language incorporated into meta tags is
285. Id. The panel suggested a neutral way of describing these lawyers would be to reference
them as "Attorneys Who Have Paid To Be Placed at the Head of the List." Id.
286. See White Paper, supra note 131, at 32.
287. See Hankins, supra note 16.
288. While not apparent when initially viewing a home page, meta tags can be seen by clicking on
"view" and then clicking on "source." See White Paper, supra note 131, at 32.
289. See id.; see also Hankins, supra note 16.
290. See White Paper, supra note 131, at 33.
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otherwise permissible for purposes of the ethical rules, lawyers should be
permitted to take advantage of this technological feature in promoting the
availability of their services. For instance, lawyers would be prohibited
from using the meta tags "excellent" and "competent" in jurisdictions
where those terms have been found to be misleading. Presumably, a
lawyer in another jurisdiction could use these terms to trigger a search,
provided the use of this language is permissible and the terms are
descriptive of the lawyer. If the troubling feature of meta tags is the fact
they are not readily apparent, perhaps lawyers should be required to
record and retain any HTML language which results in priority
placement as part of a jurisdiction's archiving requirements.
Additionally, perhaps lawyers should be required to disclose the fact that
meta tags are being used on the site itself, and include information on
how the visitor can view meta tags through the site's source code.
Invisible ink is a feature whose use some find to be more problematic
than the implementation of repetitive phrases or meta tags.29' As with
meta tags or repetitive phrases, invisible ink is used to give a site priority
placement during a search.292 However, unlike repetitive phrases or meta
tags, the HTML language that would reveal the use and content of words
or phrases in invisible ink is more difficult to access.293 Nonetheless, as
with meta tags, it stands to reason that the propriety of using invisible ink
should be judged on the basis of the content of the programmed language
used. While ease of access would effect the matter of enforcement of any
applicable rules, the hidden nature of invisible ink should not, in and of
itself, cause its use to be condemned if the language in question would
otherwise be in compliance with the rules. Again, as with meta tags, the
content of words or phrases in invisible ink could be recorded and
retained, or subjected to a filing requirement implemented by the bar.
Also, lawyers implementing invisible ink could be required to disclose
the fact of its use on the site itself to avoid fostering a misimpression.2"
291. See id "Invisible ink is the placement of words on a background with the same color as the
background so that they are not visible." Id
292. See id.
293. See id.
294. Proposed changes to the Model Rules make no provision regarding priority placement, an
omission that is intentional. To that end, the Reporter's Explanation of changes states the following:
Although aware of the creative techniques that can be used to increase the likelihood that a
browser will be directed to a law firm's website and that there is some potential for improper
use, the Commission thinks the Model Rules should not directly address such specific issues. If
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As technology continues to evolve, it is evident that many additional
practices will be available that address the access of information, as well
as its delivery. Lawyers will continue to be faced with issues that relate
to fundamental fairness and deception. It seems that the system will be
best served by taking a content-based approach to these practices,
provided that the mechanics used merely trigger a search and do not
preclude a recipient from receiving information. Filing or recording
requirements may be imposed, or to help avoid misleading
communications, disclosure requirements may be implemented.
However, significantly problematic to the lawyer in this regard are
disparate standards. If state regulations vary as to permissible content or
disclosure requirements, some lawyers will be disadvantaged. As
communications become more sophisticated and intricate, disparate
jurisdictional rules could work against lawyers in the more restrictive
states and serve to deprive the public of useful information. 95 A uniform
application of a content approach, along with archiving requirements and
uniform disclosure mandates, would better serve the public as well as the
profession.
abuses arise, they can be adequately resolved by an application of the general principles in Rules
7.1 or 8.4.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Proposed Rule 7.5, Reporter's Explanation of Changes (2000).
295. Inconsistent lawyer-publicity rules have caused problems for Member States' lawyers who
engage in cross-border practice in the European Union. See Louise L. Hill, Lawyer Publicity in the
European Union: Bans Are Removed but Barriers Remain, 29 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 381,
443-47 (1995). A mandate imposed by some Member States requires lawyers to follow more
restrictive home-state publicity rules when practicing in a host state:
If lawyers must limit the dissemination of personal publicity to more restrictive standards than
those of a jurisdiction in which they practice, the result will be the strengthening of barriers to
cross-border practice. The Diploma Directive, Lawyers' Services Directive, Draft Establishment
Directive, and the like are aimed at facilitating the ability of professionals to practice throughout
the Member States. In order to effectuate this goal, the arena in which host- and home-state
professional practice must be equalized. Preventing migrant lawyers from utilizing host-Member
State publicity rules creates an unnecessary disadvantage to lawyers engaged in cross-border
practice. If the spirit of free movement, the right of establishment, and the freedom to provide
services are to be facilitated, lawyers must be able to take advantage of a host-Member States'
rules. This is particularly significant when the rules at issue are those that would allow lawyers
to publicize the availability of their services and provide the public with useful information.
Id. at 447 (footnote omitted).
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D. Determining Which Jurisdictions' Rules Are Applicable to Internet
Communications
The a-jurisdictional nature of the Internet makes information easily
accessible without regard to state or national boundaries. Using the
Intemet, a potential client in one state can access a lawyer in another
state as easily as a lawyer in his or her home state. Suppose a lawyer uses
the domain name "excellent.competent.lawyer," or a meta tag to that
effect, in a jurisdiction where such language is permissible. Arguably,
the lawyer in the jurisdiction where this language is permissible has a
competitive advantage over the lawyer in a jurisdiction where superlative
language is precluded.296 Further, suppose that via the Internet, this
language, which is permissible in the lawyer's own jurisdiction, is
accessed by a person in another jurisdiction where its use has been
judged to be misleading. By what standard is a lawyer's communication
judged? Is the lawyer who used this language subject to discipline by
virtue of such a communication?
297
Some lawyers with multiple bar admissions attempt to comply with
the rules of each of the states where the lawyer, or a member of the
lawyer's firm, is admitted to practice and in which the firm is seeking
clients.298 An ethics committee in Iowa has taken a different approach,
however, suggesting that lawyers with multiple admissions establish
separate Web sites for Iowa and non-Iowa offices, with no hypertext
296. See Kennedy, supra note 204.
297. The legal profession is faced with significant questions regarding lawyers' Internet use
beyond those related to the classification of communications and these communications' status as
misleading or non-misleading. Is the informative nature of many Web sites and discussion groups
such that presenting information constitutes giving legal advice? Will communicating on the Internet
disqualify a lawyer or a lawyer's firm from representing other potential litigants due to conflict-of-
interest concerns? Do lawyers disseminating information from their home state run the risk of facing
charges or complaints of unauthorized practice of law? As to e-mail, since it is accessible by the
Internet Access Provider and/or the System Operator, does it create an implied waiver of
confidentiality? What is the significance of using disclaimers or encryption software? Does the
interactive and informative nature of some electronic communications constitute the establishment of
an attorney/client relationship? Regarding the latter, Professor Lanctot takes the position that giving
specific legal advice to on-line questioners ordinarily will create an attorney-client relationship. See
Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril and the Promise, 49
Duke L.J. 147, 162 (1999).
298. In determining which states' rules apply to lawyers marketing services on the Internet, the
following factors have been noted: "l) the states in which members of the firms are admitted to
practice, 2) the states in which the firm is seeking clients and 3) the states in which the firm in fact
practices." Hornsby, supra note 9.
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links.29 As an alternative, some lawyers attempt to follow the course of
least resistance and comply with the most stringent regulations among
the applicable states.3"0
These approaches, however, put a needlessly burdensome and
sometimes impossible task upon the lawyer. Given the vast variation in
state rules on advertising and solicitation, some applicable state
requirements are so different that it is impossible to be in compliance in
several states. Regarding the rules on communications, it is not an issue
of some rules being more restrictive than others, rather it is an issue of
the rules being conflicting or disparate. For instance, the labeling
requirements of the various jurisdictions may be so different that it is
impossible to be in compliance with multiple language, print size, and
color requirements of several states.3"' This is further complicated by the
fact that what appears on the screen of one person's computer may differ
from that of another person, depending on the search engine and
equipment used. Compliance with disclaimer requirements may also
create an untenable situation. To date, attempted compliance by lawyers
in this regard has led lawyers to engage in multi-page disclaimers.0 2 This
299. See Iowa Sup. Ct., Bd. of Prof. Resp., Formal Op. 96-14, [1998 Transfer Vol.] Nat'l Rep.
Legal Ethics (Univ. Pub. Am.) IA: opinions 14 (1996). It has been suggested that this separate Web-
site requirement would be of little benefit to the public and would lead to incongruous, if not
misrepresentative, results. See Krakaur, supra note 133.
300. See McCauley, supra note 4.
301. A disclosure obligation in Arizona requires that written communications under ER 7.3(b):
[B]e clearly marked on the envelope and on the first page of the communication contained in
the envelope, as follows: ADVERTISING MATERIAL: THIS IS A COMMERCIAL
SOLICITATION. Said notification shall be printed in red ink, in all capital letters, in type size
at least double the largest type size used in the body of the communication.
Ariz. Rules of Prof Conduct Rule ER 7.3(b) (1997). When dealing with electronically transmitted
solicitation, the Committee on the Rules of Professional Conduct suggested the following:
If technologically feasible, lawyers should make reasonable efforts to comply with this
requirement and send a copy of their communications, as required by ER 7.3(c), to the Clerk of
the Supreme Court and the State Bar. Absent further clarification of these requirements by the
Arizona Supreme Court, this Committee suggests that practitioners, at a minimum, include the
disclaimer language in all capital letters on the e-mail "subject" line and in the body of the
communication.
State Bar of Ariz., Comm. on Rules of Prof. Conduct, Formal Op. 97-04 (Apr. 7, 1997).
302. An example of a disclaimer attempting to comply with multi-jurisdictional mandates, found
at King & Spalding's site, provides as follows:
The materials on this World Wide Web site are provided for informational purposes only, do not
constitute legal advice, do not necessarily reflect the opinions of King & Spalding or any of its
attorneys or clients, and are not guaranteed to be correct, complete, or up-to-date. This World
Wide Web site is not intended to create an attorney-client relationship between you and King &
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practice, as well as other attempts to be compliant on a multi-
jurisdictional basis, arguably serves to confuse, rather than inform, the
public."3 It stands to reason that prospective clients may view a lawyer
with no disclaimer in a different light than a lawyer with a multi-page
caveat.
Spalding, and you should not act or rely on any information in this World Wide Web site
without seeking the advice of an attorney. We would be pleased to communicate with you by e-
mail. However, if you communicate with us through this World Wide Web site or otherwise in
connection with a matter for which we do not already represent you, your communication may
not be treated as privileged or confidential. If you communicate with us by e-mail in connection
with a matter for which we already represent you, please remember that internet e-mail is not
secure and you should avoid sending sensitive or confidential internet e-mail messages unless
they are adequately encrypted. In some jurisdictions this World Wide Web site may be
considered advertising. The hiring of a lawyer is an important decision that should not be based
solely upon written information about our qualifications and experience. King & Spalding has
endeavored to comply with all known legal and ethical requirements in compiling this World
Wide Web site. King & Spalding does not desire to represent clients based upon their review of
any portions of this World Wide Web site that do not comply with legal or ethical requirements.
The Legal Resources page on this World Wide Web site and some of the articles on this World
Wide Web site contain links to other resources on the Internet. Those links are provided as
citations and aids to help you identify and locate other Internet resources that may be of interest,
and are not intended to state or imply that King & Spalding sponsors, is affiliated or associated
with, or is legally authorized to use any trade name, registered trademark, logo, legal or official
seal, or copyrighted symbol that may be reflected in the links. To the extent the State Bar Rules
in your jurisdiction require us to designate a principal office and/or a single attorney
responsible for this World Wide Web site, King & Spalding designates its office in Atlanta,
Georgia, USA as its principal office and designates Bradley A. Slutsky as the attorney
responsible for this World Wide Web site.
Texas attorneys not certified by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization.
Md (visited July 15, 1998) <http://www.kslaw.com/disclaim.html>.
303. An example of a hypothetical disclaimer responding to fears relating to potential ethical
violations and legal liability is as follows:
This Web page is a public resource of general information which is intended, but not promised
or guaranteed, to be correct, complete and up-to-date. However, this Web page is not intended to
be a source of advertising, solicitation, or legal advice; thus the reader should not consider this
information to be an invitation for an attorney-client relationship, should not rely on information
provided herein and should always seek the advice of competent counsel in the reader's state.
The owner does not intend links on the Web page to be referrals or endorsements of the linked
entities, and the owner of this Web page will not accept referrals of employment from
unregistered referral services. Furthermore, the owner of this Web page does not wish to
represent anyone desiring representation based upon viewing this Web page in a state where this
Web page fails to comply with all laws and ethical rules of that state. Finally, the use of Internet
E-mail for confidential or sensitive information is discouraged.
Jeffrey R. Kuester, Attorney Sites Can Avoid Violations of Ethics Rules, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 12, 1996, at
B 11. It is questionable, however, whether disclaimer language can protect a lawyer from assertions
that certain conduct amounts to advertising, solicitation, or the giving of legal advice.
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It has been suggested that the Model Rules resolve the issue of which
jurisdiction's rules are applicable in situations involving lawyer
communications on the Internet. In 1993, ABA Model Rule 8.5 was
amended to address the applicability of disciplinary authority and choice
of laws when the rules of more than one jurisdiction could be applicable
to a lawyer's conduct. Focusing on a lawyer with multiple bar
admissions, Model Rule 8.5 indicates that the rules of the state in which
the lawyer principally practices are applicable to the lawyer's conduct,
unless the lawyer's conduct has its predominant effect in another
jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed.3" In the case of the latter, the
rules of that jurisdiction apply.0 5
While touted as a possible solution to the choice-of-laws issue, in
reality, Model Rule 8.5 provides only minimal help to lawyers within the
context of Internet communications.0 6 This is due to the nature of the
Internet and because the rule is directed only to lawyers with multiple
304. Model Rule 8.5 provides as follows:
(a) Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the
disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer's conduct occurs. A
lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this jurisdiction and another
jurisdiction where the lawyer is admitted for the same conduct.
(b) Choice of Law. In the exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of
professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:
(1) for conduct in connection with a proceeding in a court before which a lawyer has
been admitted to practice (either generally or for purposes of that proceeding), the
rules to be applied shall be the rules of the jurisdiction in which the court sits,
unless the rules of the court provide otherwise; and
(2) for any other conduct,
(i) if the lawyer is licensed to practice only in this jurisdiction, the rules to
be applies shall be the rules of this jurisdiction, and
(ii) if the lawyer is licensed to practice in this and another jurisdiction, the
rules to be applied shall be the rules of the admitting jurisdiction in which
the lawyer principally practices; provided, however, that if particular
conduct clearly has its predominant effect in another jurisdiction in
which the lawyer is licensed to practice, the rules of that jurisdiction shall
be applied to that conduct.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.5 (1983) (amended 1993).
305. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.5
306. One author has taken the position that "[n]either the committee that drafted amended Rule
8.5, nor the House of Delegates that adopted it, anticipated its application to advertising." Mary C.
Daly, Resolving Ethical Conflicts in MultUurisdictional Practice-Is Model Rule 8.5 the Answer, an
Answer, or No Answer at All?, 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 715, 779 (1995). Its literal application "would
paralyze large and mega-firm marketing initiatives." Id.
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admissions. With use of the Internet, it is often impossible to determine
in advance where a communication will have its "predominant effect," to
use Model Rule 8.5 language." 7 Additionally, every lawyer using the
Internet, regardless of his or her admission status, makes information
available to every state and every country where people have Internet
access. Model Rule 8.5 offers no help in resolving the dilemma of the
lawyer whose communication is accessed by, or sent to, an individual or
entity in a jurisdiction where that lawyer is not licensed to practice law.
Emerging technology has torn down traditional jurisdictional boundaries.
It is in the best interest of the public and the legal profession to confront
this fact with the goal of resolution.
E. Lawyer Communications and the Unauthorized Practice ofLaw
As lawyers disseminate information electronically, reaching people
without regard to geographic boundaries, the issue of unauthorized
practice of law must be addressed. Since lawyers, with few exceptions,
are authorized to practice law only in jurisdictions in which they are
licensed,0 s certain communications on the Internet may subject lawyers
to liability for unauthorized practice of law.3" Addressing this inquiry
307. Hornsby, supra note 167, at CI, C19.
308. There are limited exceptions to the licensing restriction, such as appearing pro hae vice, or,
"for this turn only." With the permission of the court, lawyers are sometimes permitted to represent
clients in jurisdictions where they are not admitted to practice. There is no right to appear pro hac
vice. See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979). In fact, "[i]n some jurisdictions, the attorney must
enlist a local attorney as co-counsel. This requirement is to assure compliance with local procedure
and provide accountability to the court, although some argue that it is really an economic device to
protect the local bar." Mortimer D. Schwartz et al., Problems in Legal Ethics 35 (1997).
309. See Catherine J. Lanctot & James E. Maule, The Internet-Hip or Hype? Legal Ethics and
the Internet (on file with author). An Oregon formal opinion held that it was permissible for a lawyer
to offer an online information system to the public in a for-profit joint venture with a non-lawyer.
See Oregon State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 1994-137, [1997 Transfer Vol.] 9 Nat'l Rep. Legal Ethics
(Univ. Pub. Am.) OR opinions 2 (1994). The opinion found that the following factual situation did
not constitute the promotion of the unlawful practice of law:
Lawyer wishes to engage in a joint venture for profit with a non-lawyer to offer an online legal
information system to the public that would provide information not only on substantive law
issues but also on procedural and jurisdictional matters, such as identifying applicable rules,
fees, and forms. The purpose of the proposed online information service is not only to enable
users to handle some legal matters themselves but also to advise them when they should contact
a lawyer. When accessed through a computer terminal, the online system would pose questions
to the user and generate responses derived from the system's database, without the direct
participation of an employee. The service would provide the user with a file consisting of the
system's questions, the user's responses and the information the system had provided. The
proposed enterprise does not involve the sale or distribution of legal software.
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requires a two-stage approach. First, conduct that constitutes the practice
of law must be identified; and second, it must be determined whether
conduct identified as legal practice is unauthorized.
What constitutes the "practice of law" is not easy to define.
Traditionally, the definition of "practice of law" has been left to the
individual states, which have taken different approaches."' The Model
Rules do not define the practice of law, but recently, the ABA
Multidisciplinary Practice Commission posited the following definition
for use in addressing multidisciplinary-practice (MDP) concerns:
[A]n MDP professional would be presumed to be practicing law if
the individual:
oprepares any legal document, including any deeds, mortgages,
assignments, discharges, leases, trust instruments or any other
instrument intended to affect interests in real or personal property,
wills, codicils, instruments intended to affect the disposition of
property of decedents' estates, documents relating to business and
corporate transactions, other instruments intended to affect or
secure legal rights, and contracts except routine agreements
incidental to a regular course of business;
o prepares or expresses legal opinions;
o appears or acts as an attorney in any tribunal;
o prepares any claims, demands, or pleadings of any kind, or any
written documents containing legal argument or interpretation of
law, for filing in any court, administrative agency or other tribunal;
-provides advice as to how any of the activities described above
could be accomplished in accordance with applicable law; or
o furnishes an attorney or other person to render the above
services.3 1'
Under either a typical "practice of law" standard or the MDP
definition, a lawyer expressing legal opinions or providing legal advice
Id.
310. See Report of the Commn on Multidiciplinary Practice to the ABA House of Delegates, Prof.
Law., Spring 1999, at 1, 6 n.2.
311. Lance J. Rogers, ABA Multidiciplinary Practice Commission Recommends Amending Rules
toAllowMDPs, 67 U.S.L.W. 2742, June 15, 1999, at 2744.
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to an electronic-discussion participant in a chat room would be practicing
law.312 In this situation, the question of the attorney-client relationship
would also be raised, as would the question of whether the lawyer is
giving advice about the law in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is not
licensed to practice. However, stepping back from a substantive chat-
room situation to e-mail or a Web site, what constitutes the practice of
law is less clear. Posting information for view on a home page or Web
site, arguably, would not constitute the practice of law.33 As noted by the
Nassau County, New York, Ethics Committee, "[a]dvertising out of state
is not practicing out of state.""3 4 But e-mail communications, as
contrasted with Web site postings, could raise practice-of-law claims,
depending on the nature of the contact.
In Indiana, unauthorized practice is being used as a basis to sanction
out-of-state law firms that send "solicitation letters to accident victims in
violation of the rules governing such letters in the state where the victim
resides."3 5 Although rejected by the Supreme Court of Florida when
adopting its new advertising and solicitation rules in December, 1999, a
proposed Florida rule took the position that it had jurisdiction over
lawyers who advertised or solicited for legal employment in Florida,
even if those lawyers were not admitted to practice law in Florida. The
proposed Florida rule provided that "lawyers, whether or not admitted to
practice law in Florida, who solicit or advertise for legal employment in
Florida or who target solicitations or advertisements for legal
employment at Florida residents, are engaging in the practice of law."' 316
The rules went on to state, however, that they were not applicable to
advertising not intended for dissemination in Florida and not concerning
the provision of legal services in Florida.1 7 The proposed Texas rule
312. See Lanctot & Maule, supra note 309.
313. A law-firm Web site that is passive and offers nothing other than general information and
advertising has been held not to constitute sufficient contact to permit the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the firm. See Typical Law Firm Internet Web Site Does Not Yield Personal
Jurisdiction, 15 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 9, at 212 (May 26, 1999) (citing
Remick v. Manfredy, No. 99-CV-0025 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 1999)).
314. Nassau County (N.Y.) Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. 99-3 (1999). The panel noted
that Internet advertising is not problematic as long as the jurisdiction(s) in which the lawyer is
licensed to practice are identified. See id.
315. Forkin, supra note 168.
316. Fla. Rules of Prof. Conduct Proposed Rule 3-1.3 (1998) (emphasis added).
317. See Fla. Rules of Prof Conduct Proposed Rule 4-7.1(b). A condition to the rules'
inapplicability is that the advertisement be "broadcast or disseminated in another jurisdiction in
which the advertising lawyer is admitted" and that the advertisement comply "with the rules
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provided that lawyers not licensed in Texas, who marketed their services
in Texas, would be subject to potential unauthorized-practice-of-law
sanctions.318 This is but another example of how our traditional legal
ethics rules based on individual state implementation fail to mesh with
contemporary communications.
F. National Standards Called for in Lawyer Communications
Perhaps most troubling to lawyers using the Internet today is the
question of what rules are applicable when information is accessed by
individuals in jurisdictions where the lawyer is not licensed to practice.
While a jurisdiction generally has no disciplinary authority over a lawyer
who it has not licensed to practice, several states assert the right to
discipline lawyers who are licensed in other states but practice within
their jurisdiction.3t 9 If a lawyer's conduct is judged to be impermissible,
the lawyer will be subject to discipline in his or her home jurisdiction.
The varying state regulations on lawyer communications, as well as
concerns relating to unauthorized practice of law and impermissible
solicitation, create confusion as well as an uneven playing field for
lawyers engaging in practice. "As cross-border practice becomes more
common and technological tools grow more sophisticated, lawyers
increasingly will face the challenge of developing their practice while
complying with the rules of professional conduct."32 The rules of the
collective states not only present problems for lawyers attempting to
comply with ethical mandates, but also for the consumer. Since a
potential client can access information about lawyers notwithstanding
state lines, it is often difficult for the potential client to accurately
compare information available on the Internet. Lawyers in the various
governing lawyer advertising in that jurisdiction." Fla. Rules of Prof Conduct Proposed Rule 4-
7.1(b).
South Carolina Supreme Court Rule 418, titled "Advertising and Solicitation by Unlicensed
Lawyers," requires lawyers who are not licensed to practice law in South Carolina but who seek
potential clients there to comply with the advertising and solicitation rules that govern South
Carolina lawyers. See South Carolina Adopts Novel Court Rule on Ads, Solicitation by Out-of-State
Lawyers, U.S.L.W., July 6,1999, at 2006,
318. See Forkin, supra note 168.
319. See supra notes 311-14 and accompanying text In addition, Alaska, Arkansas, California,
Maryland, Michigan, and North Carolina have rules subjecting lawyers who are not admitted in their
respective jurisdictions, but practice within their respective states, to the state's disciplinary
authority. See Daly, supra note 306, at 749-50 & n.146.
320. Arthur Garwin, Way Over the Client Limit, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1999, at 71.
Vol. 75:785, 2000
Lawyer Communications on the Internet
jurisdictions will obviously present information differently, depending
on the applicable rules. It is not unreasonable for a potential client to
view a lawyer with a long disclaimer more skeptically than a lawyer who
has none. Nor is it unreasonable for a potential client to be more
favorably impressed by a lawyer who describes his or her work in
superlatives, rather than the lawyer who states limitations of his or her
practice.
At the present time, the Model Rules are being reviewed and a
discussion draft has been released suggesting changes to both the rules
and comments that relate to lawyer communications reflecting Internet
use and emerging technologies.32' Although the suggested changes to the
rules reflect some intricacies of electronic communication, they are
relatively broad. Any rules that are implemented should be broad enough
to relate to continually evolving technological advances. However, of
paramount importance to lawyers is knowing exactly what the governing
rules are. As is evident from the significant variation in communication
standards of the Model Rule states today, Model Rule amendments to
this effect will not provide the legal profession with the necessary
solution.
The a-jurisdictional nature of the Internet is such that lawyer
communications should be regulated by national standards rather than by
individual state rules. This is not meant to suggest the creation of
national licensing of lawyers, although some find "a uniform standard
for the admission and discipline of lawyers in the federal courts" to be
appealing.322 Rather, what this Article suggests are uniform standards on
lawyer communications, with interpretive guidelines, to be regulated by
the individual states. While it is evident that state-based regulation will
result in some differences in interpretation, uniform standards with
interpretive guidelines will go a long way toward leveling the playing
field. Lawyers need to know what rules are applicable and how they are
being implemented. Lawyers need to be able to predict how their actions
will be interpreted in order to properly conduct themselves in their legal
practice. Technological changes have helped to render state-by-state
321. See supra note 131. The White Paper has been submitted to Ethics 2000 for their
consideration in reviewing the Model Rules on lawyer communications. See supra note 131.
322. See Daly, supra note 306, at 782. Professor Daly goes on to state' that "[i]f a national bar
means a unitary system of admission and discipline, replacing the current state-based regime, the
proposal is unrealistic as a matter of politics, unworkable as a matter of administration and unsound
as a matter of policy." Id. Professor Daly questions the effectiveness of centralized regulation for a
national bar, as well as its threat to the independence of the legal system. See id. at 783-84.
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regulation of the profession in this regard both ineffective and obsolete.
The fundamental question of characterization of conduct will best be
addressed by a unified standard, providing a directive for lawyers and
enabling the public to access information that can be more easily
evaluated and understood.
V. CONCLUSION
The individual states have held that lawyer communications on the
Internet are subject to rules governing lawyer advertising and
solicitation. As lawyers and law firms increase their presence on the
Internet, many lawyers are for the first time engaging in conduct that is
considered advertising. Because each state has its own rules on lawyer
communications that govern the lawyers practicing in its jurisdiction,
members of the profession must contend with varying standards on a
jurisdictional basis.
An overwhelming majority of the states have adopted the Model
Rules. However, most of those states have decided to implement
standards on lawyer communications that vary from the Model Rule
mandates. Along with variation in the rules themselves, significant
diversity exists in the interpretation and applicability of the rules. What is
a misleading communication or practice in one jurisdiction may be
permissible in another. Labeling and retention provisions are different, as
are disclosure and disclaimer requirements. The nature of the Internet has
the effect of tearing down traditional jurisdictional boundaries. Applying
existing rules to electronic communications raises questions relating to
which jurisdiction's rules apply, as well as which specific standard is
applicable.
The Internet, having no geographic boundaries, should be regulated by
national standards and not controlled by individual state rules. Lawyers
need to know what rules are applicable and how they are being
implemented. Lawyers need to be able to predict how their actions will
be interpreted in order to properly conduct themselves in their practice of
law. The fundamental question of characterization of conduct will best
be addressed by a unified standard. This will help level the playing field
among practitioners and enable lawyers to more effectively represent
clients.
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